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To write down these imperfect 
But sincere words, 
We want to evidence 
The existence of this generation. 
- - J in Guantao and Liu Qingfeng^ 
Many people find particularly difficult to understand the 
generation which born during the founding of the PRC and reached its 
youth in the period of the Cultural Revolution. Some even neglect them 
or keep a wary eye the members of this generation. Nonetheless, they 
are unique because they shared the history of the PRC. They have gone 
through painful disillusioned experience. This experience, however, 
forced them to rethink the problem of China. This generation just like 
the phoenix rose from the ashes. Their special way of thinking and 
numerous precious works, written or unwritten, demonstrate that no one 
should underestimate their significance in the Chinese history. 
The purpose of this thesis is to study this generation of Chinese 
intellectuals. I would not deny that I am taking an erapathic approach 
in this subject. If anyone has shared the same amount of stories of the 
above-mentioned generation as I do, he or she would probably do the 
same thing. In past years of my life, I have talked to many members of 
this generation. I have been told how they weathered interruption in 
their lives, social adversity and having been cheated in the Cultural 
Revolution. I have also learnt how they experienced the sudden and 
thorough awakening. I find that they are reflective, full of feeling in 
their general approach to the contemporary situation. It is their 
experiences and attitudes to China that motivated me to do such a 
research on them. 
To study this subject is also because it is my personal concern 
on the fate of the Chinese. I always hope that when I study the 
problems of contemporary Chinese intellectuals, I may find a viable 
direction for China's future. To the future, I am optimistic, even 
though there are many difficulties to be solved. I place high hopes on 
the younger generations because they have shown ability and 
consciousness to extricate from the predicament. They are the 
inspiration of the future. 
This thesis begins with a general review of the concept of 
"intellectuals" in Chinese context, and several approaches adopted by 
Ijin Guantao， Liu Qingfeng, Jin Guantao, L i u _ _ Q i n ^ f e n ^ _ H 
(Collections of Works of Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng) (Herbin: 
Heilungjiang Jiao-yu Chu-ban She, 1988)， p.485. 
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Western scholars to study Chinese intellectuals. The objective is to 
stress the need to study the roles of young generation of Chinese 
intellectuals in post-Mao China• However， a brief review on the 
evolution of the CCP's policy toward intellectuals is followed because 
it helps not merely understand the perception of the party-state on the 
roles of intellectuals, but also examine the life situation of young 
intellectuals. Then, Chapter 3 explores the distinctive characteristics 
and orientation of the above-mentioned generation of Chinese 
intellectuals. How they perceive their roles as intellectuals is also 
discussed. With a case study on two representatives of this generation, 
Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Chapter 4 hopes to draw a profile of this 
generation， so as to improve people's understanding. Finally, the paper 
concludes with a look at the importance of Chinese intellectuals to 
participate in China's reform and to be reformed in order to act as 
real intellectuals. It is hoped that the young intellectuals would take 
the initiative to develop as an independent social stratum in China. I 
believe it is an important element to advance China. 
I would like to express heartfelt gratitude to my thesis 
supervisor, Dr. Peter N.S. Lee, who provided stimulating guidance, 
encouragement and criticism in all phases of this study. Without his 
help, the thesis could not have been undertaken. 
Furthermore, two members of my committee, Dr. Tony K.S. Liao and 
Dr. C.Y. Cheng, gave careful and critical readings to later drafts of 
this thesis. I would like to thank them, too. 
My deepest debt of gratitude is to Professor Jin Guantao and Liu 
Qingfeng for their willingness to help young student and their candid 
talk in the interviews I conducted. I also owe a special debt to You 
Ji, Yang Hongchang, Yu Jiaqing and other members of the "generation as 
old as the Republic" I talked before. All of them provided me 
indispensable information to finish the thesis. It is to them that the 
paper also dedicated. 
Greatest appreciation is due to Susan J. Renders for her 
excellent work on editing my paper. Her help in translating some 
Chinese concepts to the Westerners is valuable. 
Most part of this thesis is finished at the Universities Service 
Centre in the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which provided me 
marvellous environment, convenient facilities and rich materials for 
studying. My thanks go to its staff for their kind assistance. 
In addition, friends who shared the difficulties and time to 
finish the research are friends indeed. I am most grateful to them. 
Last but not the very least, I am indebted to my parents. Because 
of their love, patience and support, this thesis could come into being. 
Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the contents of this 
paper and for whatever mistakes remain. 





In China, the term ” zhi-shi fen-zT means "knowledgable person." 
It has been translated into "intellectuals" in English, but actually 
has a broader meaning than its usage in the West. In 1980, an article 
in Bei.iing Review stated that the term intellectual in China "embraces 
professors, scientists, senior engineers and writers who are commonly 
known as well as ordinary technicians in factories, primary school 
teachers and other mental workers with professional knowledge.'“ In 
this sense, there were three million Chinese intellectuals in 1949， 
while the number increased to five million by 1957, and 25 million in 
1980.2 
In fact, in Mao's era, "intellectuals" included an even greater 
number of people. Mao, like Stalin, held that the category of 
intellectuals included all those with at least a middle-school 
education or the equivalent.' No wander so many people suffered under 
the intellectual policy of the Communist Party of China (CCP), in 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution. 
Nonetheless, the definition stated in Bei.i ing Review in 1980 
changed again in 1982， when the idea of expertise took on prestige once 
again. According to the census of 1982， "intellectuals" or ” zhi-shi 
fen-zi" were all those who have received tertiary education or are 
studying in universities or colleges. While the population of 
university graduates was 4.5 million, the students who were studying or 
1 
had studied in universities or colleges were 1.5 million. Thus, the 
total population of intellectuals is approximately six million people, 
about 0.6 per cent of the total population of China in 1982. The census 
also showed that the largest number of intellectuals worked in 
cultural, educational and industrial arenas, but scientific and 
educational institutes had the highest proportion of intellectuals 
among their employees.^ 
However, another article in Outlook Weekly {Liao Wan) in 1988 
claimed that, because China is a developing country, intellectuals 
should include those people doing mental tasks, those who graduated 
from polytechnic schools, colleges or universities, those who have been 
given special titles for their professional skill, and those secondary 
or primary school teachers who qualify under government teaching. Under 
this definition, there would be 20-million intellectuals, amounting to 
2 per cent of the total population of China. Most of them would be 
f 
working in scientific and technological jobs. Unless otherwise stated, 
I have adopted the definition of intellectuals used in Outlook Weekly 
throughout this thesis. 
In common Western usage, by contrast, the terra “intellectual" 
usually refers to a person with good reasoning, who is interested in 
things of the mind, and above all, capable of serious independent 
thinking. Because intellectuals are often conceived of as guides of the 
conscience of the society, especially when that conscience opposes the 
established order. In other words, not all those who do intellectual 
work are called "intellectuals." Rather, a true intellectual is 
concerned with important, even ultimate things. 
Therefore, when one investigates the question of China's 
intellectuals, he or she is likely to become concerned about their 
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degree of autonomy and independence, their often difficult relations 
vdth the holders of power, and their potential revolutionary roles. He 
or she may find that intellectuals in China have very limited autonomy 
and independence. Although they have made many important contributions 
to society, China's intellectuals always suffered the most in political 
campaigns. Yet, they still commit themselves to the development of 
their nation. What are the roles of China's intellectuals? How does the 
party-state perceive intellectuals' roles? And how do intellectuals 
view their position in contemporary China? The answers may puzzle those 
unfamiliar with Chinese culture, history and contemporary politics. 
However, one would find in the following chapters of this thesis that 
the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals expects differently 
comparing to their elders, although they are still patriotic. Their 
awareness of modern intellectuals‘ roles demonstrates the real position 
of intellectuals in China nowadays. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The problem of intellectuals in contemporary China has been 
studied by several Western scholars in the last few decades. No matter 
whether they investigated the situation of intellectuals before 1949, 
from 1949 to 1976， or in post-Mao China, they seemed to take a common 
approach to this problem. They more or less used sociological 
viewpoint to study Chinese intellectuals. Thus, their works usually 
tended to focus on how external factors, especially political factors, 
influenced the performance of social roles by Chinese intellectuals. 
Most of the scholars adopted sociological definitions originally 
used to describe the "intellectuals" or "intelligentsia" of in 
3 
nineteenth-century Russia, although some of them also considered the 
traditional Chinese classifications of "literati" {shi) or "educated 
person" {du shu ren). Hararin and Cheek adopted Edward Shils' 
definition of intellectuals in the International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, arguing that they are those "'who share the high and 
general intellectual culture', are primary engaged in intellectual 
activities that define the 'ultimate' or the ideal -- issues 
inseparable from political authority -- and have 'affirmed, accepted 
and served the ruling a u t h o r i t i e s ' . T h i s is especially true in 
China, as "the scholar二officials (shi) have gained tremendous political 
power of state administration and as personal counsellors or agents of 
the sovereign. "10 Goldman and Cheek (1987) even specified the term 
"high-level intellectuals" (gao-ji zhi-shi fen-zi) in the People's 
Republic of, China (PRC), which included academics, writers, artists, 
doctors, scientists, engineers, lawyers, economists, journalists, to 
fit Shil' s definition of i n t e l l e c t u a l s . In other words they studied 
mainly high-level intellectuals" rather than all of those who would be 
considered intellectuals under the PRC's official definition of '^zhi-
shi fen-zi," 
What are the characteristics of China's intellectuals nowadays? 
Goldman and Cheek think that they continue to carry the traditional 
characteristics of literati that they are servants of the state and 
moral critics of the ruler. But at the same time, they "have had to 
find their place in the modern world", because "they are part of the 
10 
official establishment in the PRC. Just as Israel pinpointed that 
"the cooptation of intellectuals into bureaucratic alliances is by no 
means, however, a uniquely Chinese phenomenon," China's intellectuals 
thus differ from Western intellectuals in the way that they usually 
4 
play a role inside the political establishment, instead of outside and 
in tension with the polity. 
Historical events also made contemporary intellectuals different 
form the traditional literati. Goldman and Cheek suggested that "three 
interrelated process helped transform the imperial elite into the 
intellectuals of today". First, "the fall of the monarchy in 1911 
reinforced the elite's consciousness of themselves as autonomous 
critics of political authority". In this way, some twentieth-century 
intellectuals became similar to a modern alienated intelligentsia. The 
second process was the emergence of nationalism, which made 
intellectuals feel strongly that China should survive as a nation. 
Thirdly, the development of the Leninist-style political parties, i.e. 
the Guomindang and Chinese Communist parties, provided new channels for 
intellectuals to participate in politics. However, these parties 
"demanded even more exclusive ideological loyalty than had the dynastic 
s y s t e m . F i n a l l y , after the May-Fourth movement brought Western 
values such as freedom of expression and individual rights into China, 
many educated Chinese sought to emancipate themselves from "patriarchal 
authority". This contradictory heritage has produced complex roles for 
China's intellectuals in recent d e c a d e s . [ 
Israel has argued that China's intellectuals have been 
transformed from the independent critics they were in the May-Fourth 
period into participants in the "bureaucratic-intellectual syncretism" 
of the past quarter century. He isolates a total of eight stages, 
(i.e. 1917-1927, 1927-1937， 1938-1948, 1945-1959， 1960-1965, 1966-1971， 
1971-1976, 1976-present). This development of eight stages reflect the 
increasingly dependent status of intellectuals. As centralized 
political power became more pervasive, intellectuals had less and less 
5 
autonomy. In recent years, most intellectuals perceive that to co-
operate vrith their bureaucratic protectors is the only way to advance 
their own interest and transform the establishment from within.^^ 
Different Approaches to the study of China，s Intellectuals 
There are several significant approaches to the study of 
intellectuals of contemporary China. Some scholars investigate 
intellectuals' roles, some classify intellectuals by discussing their 
main concerns, some classify them by studying their relationship to 
central power, and some study intellectuals by dividing them into 
different generations. Generally speaking, most Western scholars study 
the problem of intellectuals from biographical perspective and try to 
find out how political issues influenced particular individuals. 
Goldman (1981) studied dissident intellectuals in the PRC. Under 
her definition, there are "a small number of well-placed intellectuals 
17 
have periodically questioned the Chinese Communist Party's policies.“ 
They are "a critical, politically aware segment of the intellectual 
class, in the tradition of the nineteenth century Russian 
intelligentsia and the dissident Confucian literati of the dynastic 
era."i8 This group of intellectuals is more interested in transmitting 
a set of ideas than in practising a profession, although they are 
generally trained in history, humanities, literature and philosophy, 
and have been active in academia， journalism, the theatre, and 
l i t e r a t u r e T h e y did not express their views through the formal 
organizations to which they belonged. Instead, they divided themselves 
into informal, non-organizational groups on the basis of personal and 
. 20 
professional connections. 
According to Goldman, in the period between the Great Leap 
6 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals were divided into 
two major camps. She labelled those who challenged Maoist policies as 
"liberal" intellectuals and those who, in turn, defended Mao's policies 
"radical" intellectuals. However, both of these two groups had to 
remain attached to their political patrons to express their view. They 
used the opportunity created by political factionalism, not only to 
support their patrons' cause, but also to influence policy in ways that 
2 1 
the leadership did not intend. 
Most of the liberal intellectuals had been born around the first 
decade of the twentieth century, while the radical intellectuals were 
younger. Although both of these groups mainly spent their formative 
years in the cosmopolitan cultural circles of Shanghai, the radical 
intellectuals had grown up at a period less open to Western ideas and 
received a more Marxist-oriented education. After 1949， the liberal 
intellectuals usually got important cultural, academic, and journalist 
positions in the government and the party, such as in the Beijing Party 
Committee, the Propaganda Department, and in the academic community. 
Compared to the liberal intellectuals, the radical intellectuals 
belonged to a lower level of officials. They comprised two overlapping 
groups: one from the Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the 
Chinese Academy of Science, the other from the Shanghai Party 
22 
Committee's Propaganda Department. The liberals identified with the 
professionals and technocrats spawned by modernization, whereas the 
radicals identified with the younger elite trying to make their way up 
the political ladder. The differences between their ideological 
24 
lines and their concerns caused conflicts between these two groups. 
However, the suppression of the liberals was not because of these 
ideological differences, but the factional rivalry between their 
7 
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patrons. What Goldman wanted to point out was that China's 
intellectuals usually acted as individuals. They lacked both a 
corporate identity and an autonomous organization, and used only 
ideology and philosophy rather than science to justify their work. 
This was why they failed to function like the Western intellectuals and 
why their fated has usually been linked to the ups and down of the 
political leadership in past few decades. 
In their edited book, Cheek and Hamrin (1986) suggested another 
fit 
angle for investigating China's intellectuals. Their collection of 
works on seven of China's establishment intellectuals^^ was divided 
into four groups, "ranging from a senior Party patron who acted at the 
very centre of power, to Party intellectuals working in close 
cooperation with such patrons, to establishment scholars more distant 
from high-level politics as they served national institutions, to the 
fringe of the establishment where creative writers and youth debate the 
27 
issues of the day with much less knowledge and influence. “ The 
editors tried to explain that an analysis of the conflicts between 
party and intellectuals was not to suggest a dichotomy of interests, 
but a traditional patron-client network, varying according to the level 
23 
of political involvement of particular intellectuals.⑶ 
Cheek and Hamrin，s book used Peng Zhen, an expert in law-making 
with ties to some in^t^^l^ctuals, as an example of someone at the centre 
of power. In the second ring out from the centre of power were Deng Tuo 
and Yang Xianzhen. Yang was a member of central committee and director 
of the central Party school, whereas Deng was the editor of the 
People's Daily, and a member of the Beijing Party committee. Examples 
of establishment scholars more distant from high-level politics were 
Sun Ye fang, who directed the Institute of Economic Research in the 
8 
Academy of Social Sciences and advised the State Council, and Wu Han, 
who was Beijing Vice-Mayor, a famous historian teaching at the Beijing 
University, and some activists in government-sponsored political and 
professional associations. On the fringe of the structure, a cultural 
worker in the military, Bai Hua, was the example, while youths 
represented the out circle. 
The book above-mentioned showed the lack of a horizontal 
professional or interest group among intellectuals. Attempts by 
establishment intellectuals to defend the Great Leap Forward 
9Q 
represented their effort to "retool" Chinese Communism. It seemed 
that Leninist norms of behaviour have strongly reshaped traditional 
30 
modes of intellectual behaviour, and the life histories of those 
scholar-officials clearly paralleled those of intellectuals in Eastern 
31 
Europe. The book suggested, furthermore, that Marxist-Leninism had 
been more influential than Confucianism on the development of 
contemporary Chinese intellectuals. 
Both Yahuda (1978) and Schwarcz (1983) have written articles on 
generational transition in China. Although Yahuda's article was titled 
as "Political Generations in China", the scope was limited to the 
3 2 
educated groups within the urban sector. 
Yahuda's article quoted M. Rintala's definition of "political 
generations" from the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 
as "a group of individuals who have undergone the same basic historical 
experience during their formative years" (described as "approximately 
between 17 and 25"). Thus differences among generations are not 
biological considerations, but differences in historical experiences 
and reactions to those experiences, 
Yahuda identified five broadly defined political generations. 
9 
"The older cadres" were those who joined the party or the army well 
before Liberation; "the older intellectuals" were those who received a 
higher education before 1949; "the 1950s Generation" were those who 
completed their senior secondary schooling or tertiary education and 
became cadres for the first time during the 1950s and were influenced 
by Soviet patterns; the "lost generation" were those whose education 
was affected by the Cultural Revolution; and "the new generation" were 
those who grew to maturity in the post-Cultural Revolution 
environment.^^ 
To Yahuda, the older cadres and older intellectuals shared 
similar experiences of persecution. As a result, the older cadres had 
changed their attitude towards intellectuals. Therefore, "both the 
political generations now share a commitment to modernization, 
expertise, legality and the strengthening of China. The 1950s 
generation occupies the middle-level bureaucracy and its members will 
be China's leaders very soon due to their age and promotion by their 
elders. However, Yahuda appreciates the "lost generation" the most 
I 
because "this generation is aware of its ignorance of the outside world 
and is particularly keen to improve its knowledge and understanding of 
OP 
the West. ‘ Thus, it is the most independent-minded and the most 
active generation which "has posed many problems to the new leadership 
because of its readiness to campaign in public for the redress of 
grievance concerning them that have been left over since the Cultural 
117 
Revolution.' Regarding the new generation, it was too early for 
Yahuda to say anything with confidence at the time he wrote this 
article. Nonetheless, Yahuda still suggested it might be interesting 




Vera Schwarcz and Li Zehou separated intellectuals of 
contemporary China into six generations: the generation of 1911, the 
May-Fourth generation, the 1930s generation, the generation of the 
anti-Japanese War, the liberation generation (of the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s), and the generation of Red Guard.^^ To Li and Schwarcz, 
political events in modern Chinese history seemed to be the most 
important influences distinguishing and shaping the social life of 
various generations. Therefore the Revolution of 1911, the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919， the revolution of 1925-1927, the Anti-Japanese War, 
Liberation, and the Cultural Revolution functioned as boundaries 
between generations•⑶ Certainly the focus of their analysis mainly 
comprise revolutionary intellectuals who "contributed something unique 
to the national salvation movement which has preoccupied China since 
the reform of 1889."*' 
Members of the generation of 1911 were enthusiastic participants 
and leaders of the 1911 Revolution. Although they received a very high 
level of training in the traditional examination system, they attempted 
to use Western culture to complement traditional Chinese culture. The 
May Fourth generation tried to find new ways to solve China's cultural 
dilemma. They were the advocates of the new cultural movement. This 
generation was the first to explore Marxism and champion the slogan of 
science and democracy/^ 
Among the six generations, Li and Schwarcz thought that the 
generation of the 1920s was the most important and most creative 
generation which "shaped the course of modern Chinese history up to the 
p r e s e n t . I t was because "they were builders, believers who followed 
and benefited from the previous generation of doubters and 
destroyers•“ In contrast, the Anti-Japanese War generation was merely 
11 
a follower of the previous generations. Marxism had more influence on 
them. Most of the cultural and political leaders in power in China 
today belong to this generation 
Similar to Yahuda's observation on the 1950s generation, Li and 
Schwarcz pointed out that the Liberation period generation was deeply 
affected and shaped by the Soviet model of education. Because of its 
particular historical circumstances, this generation have been hampered 
in their creativity. Thus, in the long run, they did not contribute 
significantly to new creative development in science, arts, politics 
and philosophy 
The Cultural Revolution generation is the same as "the lost 
generation" identified by Yahuda. However, Li and Schwarcz thought that 
this generation returned to the situation of the May Fourth generation 
- - t h e y tried to raise questions about many things, to reevaluate; they 
17 
explored new patterns and models. 
Both generational studies tell us how historical events affected 
the characteristics of intellectuals of different generations. 
J I 
Although it is still difficult to place some intellectuals into 
particular generation, as they may have played key roles in the lives 
of more than one generation, these studies are worth reading because 
they can help our understanding of China's intellectuals and rectify 
the shortcomings of intellectual history written in Chinese. 
Goldman, Cheek and Hamrin (1987) edited another book which 
explores the new state-intellectual relationship. In the book, China，s 
Intellectuals and the State, they studied the intellectuals by looking 
at their roles in recent decades. Goldman and Cheek think that 
traditions and historical events have produced three major roles for 
intellectuals: ideological spokesmen, professional and academic elite, 
12 
and critical intellectuals. Some intellectuals have rotated among these 
roles at different times in their careers.^^ 
Scholar-cadres are ideological spokesmen who usually uphold the 
status quo and go along with official policy. Although sometimes they 
may privately disagree with the polity, they still stand out as 
propagators and guardians of official ideology and values. Nonetheless, 
they sometimes find difficulties when their loyalty to the political 
leadership and to party come into conflict.“ 
The academic and professional elites are those who define 
themselves more on the basis of their professional skill than in terms 
of the party's ideology; they are patriots. Nonetheless, when tensions 
arose between their patriotic commitments and professional commitments, 
they refuse to compromise with the party, despite political pressure to 
do so because the party's increasing tendency to identify patriotism 
with obedience to the party's own shifting political lines and its 
modernization program. At the same time, the party still tries to win 
cooperation from professionals and academics by periodically allowing 
I 
them to‘express their views more freely. Furthermore, in Mao's China, 
the party regarded this group of intellectuals' demand for the right to 
practise their professions without political interference as an 
implicit challenge and a political threat. Nonetheless, since Deng 
Xiaoping's modernization policies are based on utilizing the 
technocratic professions, scientists and economists have been given 
more special privileges than those in non-scientific, humanistic 
. . 50 
professions. 
Unlike the professionals, critical intellectuals are usually 
generalists. They were more concerned with political issues than with 
political status. Since they acted as the traditional critical 
13 
literati, they tried to improve the relationship between the ruler and 
the ruled and to improve the prevailing system, but not to replace it. 
The critical intellectuals in the PRC may have been influenced to some 
degree by Western liberal ideas which flowed into China in the early 
decades of twentieth century. However, they represent different 
generations and different approaches to criticizing the shortcomings of 
the system. They perceived themselves as intermediaries between the 
government and the people, advisors to the state and speakers on behalf 
u 
of the people. 
The foregoing analysis of intellectuals' roles suggests that 
intellectuals nowadays still face the same dilemmas as before: "how to 
serve their country and help make it rich, powerful, and modern without 
t ^  
compromising their intellectual and moral values. When they claim 
themselves to be "conscience of the society" and try to speak on behalf 
of "the people", they never make clear whether they are capable of 
representing all the wishes of the general public. In addition, they 
still want to improve the system, but not to replace it. According to 
I 
the scholars who contributed to Goldman, Cheek and Hamrin's book, the 
above-mentioned points were the shortcomings of intellectuals in the 
PRC. 
Studies on Policies toward Intellectuals in the PRC 
To study intellectuals in China, one cannot neglect the political 
environment in the PRC. Therefore, many studies have investigated 
official state policies toward intellectuals so as to find out how 
these policies have influenced the working and living conditions of 
intellectuals and, most important of all, the roles they have played. 
From many studies, we know that most intellectuals in the PRC 
14 
have been suppressed, persecuted and discriminated against for a along 
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time. In particular between 1957 to 1976， the period extending from 
the anti-Rightist Campaign to the end of the Cultural Revolution, a 
great number of intellectuals were attacked and labelled "bourgeois 
rightists". They were practically excluded from the alliance of 
peasants and workers and were viewed as the "stinking ninth category" 
of class enemies during the Cultural Revolution. China's intellectuals 
were usually the first group to suffer during the various political 
campaign 
Nonetheless, after a long period of malignant neglect, there was 
a surprisingly different tone in propaganda about the intellectuals 
after 1978. Especially after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, held at the end of 1978, 
the government initiated a series of policies to correct past errors in 
their treatment of intellectuals. Some of the frame-ups and false 
charges imposed on intellectuals were redressed. Intellectuals were 
restored to their former posts and living and working conditions are 
said to‘have improved. 
However J several studies on intellectual policies in the 1980s 
point out that the Party's treatment of intellectuals continues to 
zigzag. The arrest of Wei Jingsheng in the late 1970s, the criticism 
of Bai Hua's "Unrequited Love" in the early 1980s, the Spiritual 
Pollution Campaign in 1983-84, the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization 
Campaign in 1987 showed that the freedom of intellectuals was still 
l i m i t e d . E s p e c i a l l y at the time of the June 4 incident, there were 
indications that the intellectual policy pendulum has shifted from 
56 
comparatively relaxed to rather tight since mid-1989. In fact, 
the party-state policies toward intellectuals are in many respects a 
15 
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reflection of how it perceive the state-intellectual relationship. 
Generally, the party tightens its control over intellectuals until it 
finds it needs their cooperation and the intellectuals appear reluctant 
to work; then the party relaxes its control. However, when the party 
feels that its dominance is threatened, it tightens up again. 
Nonetheless, the leadership is more willing to accommodate the 
scientific, professional and managerial intellectuals whose skills are 
directly related to the modernization program, than literary 
intellectuals whose skills are less clearly relevant and whose works 
are more influential among the public. Therefore, scientists and 
technocrats have been given more autonomy to their work, while 
intellectual autonomy for humanists and writers is still intermittent 
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and conditional in post-Mao China. To the party, intellectuals have 
always been the means to the modernization, rather than the end. This 
attitude remains. 
RESEARCH SCOPE AND AREA 
The previously mentioned works have focused on the 
characteristics, roles and generational attributes of China's 
intellectuals, as well as the intellectual policies of the CCP. They 
have spent much of their analysis on the influence of traditional 
Confucian literati, the enlightenment of the May Fourth Movement, and 
the impact of historical events on intellectuals in contemporary China. 
However, in order to understand the problem of intellectuals in 
post-Mao China, further investigation is needed on the younger 
generation, "the Cultural Revolution generation" as identified by Li 
and Schwarcz, or the "lost generation" as identified by Yahuda. 
16 
According to the 1982 census, the population of this group of 
intellectuals is around 1.33 million (i.e. the 25 to 34 age group in 
1982), which accounted for 21.9 percent of the total population of 
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intellectuals. Many people neglect this generation, not merely 
because of their comparatively small numbers, but also because of the 
influences the Cultural Revolution had on them. People think that this 
generation's creativity has been limited and, thus, less significant 
than the other generation in the developing process of China.^^ Some 
older generations keep a wary eye the members of this group due to the 
Art 
actions of the Red Guards, to which some of them belonged. Are they 
really of no use? 
In fact, this generation is special because it has not been 
influenced by Soviet thinking. They were awakened by the traumatic 
experiences of the Cultural Revolution and the influx of Western 
thoughts under the open door policy of China in the 1980s. Thus, they 
are more critical and creative than their ancestors. They are not like 
the older generation which have been ruined by the political campaigns 
and felt powerless to make further contributions. This generation 
remains hopeful even in uncertain circumstances. Nor they are similar 
to the even younger generation which has minimum experience of the 
Cultural Revolution and shows impatience with the backwardness of 
China. They instead works for steady progress of China as they have 
better understanding of the situation. Most important of all, many 
members of this generation have participated actively in intellectual 
activities of post-Mao China. They certainly have taken an important 
role in Chinese history. What are the roles of this generation in 
China's modernization? How do they view themselves and their roles? 
Their perceptions are directly linked with the future of China because 
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this group is reaching the age where its members will soon play more 
significant roles. 
For these reasons, this thesis will study the above-mentioned 
generation of Chinese intellectuals. For the sake of convenience, I 
call them the "generation as old as the Republic," a name they use to 
refer to themselves. They were born in the late 1940s and 1950s, grew 
up during the years after the founding of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949 and reached their teenage years in the period of 
the Cultural Revolution. This generation was forced to think hard 
during the political campaigns of those years of turmoil and became 
active on the political and social scene in the post-Mao reform era. 
This generation has deep feelings about the history of the PRC. Because 
they have always shared the fate of the PRC, what they do now and in 
the near future is important to China. In fact, some members of this 
generation are not unknown to people who are concerned with China. They 
include Wei Jingsheng who participated in the Democratic Movement in 
1979 and was arrested by the party-state later, and Chen Ziming and 
Wang Juntao, who supported student protests in 1989. They are all in 
prison how. 
The French historian, Marc Bloch， has given a classic definition 
of what constitutes a generation: 
Men who are born into the same social environment about the 
same time necessarily come under analogous influences, 
particularly in their formative years. Experience proves 
that, by comparison with either considerably older or 
considerably younger groups, their behaviour reveals 
certain distinctive characteristics which are ordinarily 
very clear. This is true even of their bitterest 
disagreements. To be excited by the same dispute, even on 
opposing sides, is still to be alike. This common st^amp, 
deriving from common age, is what makes a generation. 
Therefore, one purpose of this thesis is to explore some of the 
"analogous influences" and "distinctive characteristics" of the 
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"generation as old as the Republic" of Chinese intellectuals. How did 
common experiences fashion their personalities and condition their 
general outlook? By reviewing 七 h e historical road they passed, we may 
find the answer. Furthermore, what are the values of this generation? 
Do Confucianism and Marxism still have an impact on them? How do they 
find their position in modernizing China? Thus, the orientation of this 
generation and their thinking will also be studied (Chapter 3). 
Moreover, in order to increase the understanding on this generation, I 
shall attempt to explore the preceding questions by examining the lives 
and works of a famous intellectual couple of this generation, Jin 
Guantao and Liu Qingfeng (see Chapter 4). 
Before going on this study of the generation of Chinese 
intellectuals that is as old as the republic, I will review the 
intellectual policies of the PRC, This will help us understand the 
political environment of this and other generations of intellectuals in 
China (see Chapter 2). It is important to know how the party-state 
perceives the role and the status of intellectuals in socialist China 
) 1 
as theseiperceptions have an important impact on state policies toward 
intellectuals. 
Finally, the conclusion of this thesis will try to examine how 
the party-state defines the role of intellectuals in the reform 
program, and how intellectuals expect their relationship with the 
reforms to develop. Does this generation of intellectuals form or is it 
coming to form an independent social stratum? By answering all these 
questions, I hope to shed light on the role of the "generation as old 
as the Republic" of Chinese intellectuals in China's development. 
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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH SOURCES 
To study this generation is no easy task because there has been 
very little research done on it. One exception is Anita Chan's Children 
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of Mao. This is the first study to penetrate the inner world of the 
youths who grew up during the Cultural Revolution. Chan describes the 
personality development of four of her interviewees whom she met in the 
1970s, and shows how the Communist Party's political teaching helped 
shape their social attitudes and psychological make-up. Another example 
is Anne F. Thurston's book, Enemies of the People, which examines the 
ordeal of the intellectuals in the Cultural Revolution/^ Part of her 
book again focuses on why and how the upheaval occurred, and the 
political scars it left in the minds of Chinese youths. Both Chan's and 
Thurston's books are about the experiences and feeling of individual 
Chinese youths during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. However, 
they all failed to probe these youths' roles as intellectuals in post-
Mao China. 
Therefore, this study of the "generation as old as the Republic" 
I 
1 
is maiiily based on primary resources and my own observations and 
understandings gleaned from previous talks, formal or informal, with 
some members of this generation. Most of my conclusion about their 
values and characteristics come from examining some of their writings, 
with the help of some sociological research done in China on this 
generation. I was unable to employ a field methods or formal interviews 
of a representative sample of these intellectuals because of time and 
financial limitations. Nonetheless, I have conducted interviews with 
Professor Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, which I use as a case study of 
the "generation as old as the Republic.“ Together with a study of some 
of Jin and Liu's written works, I try to draw a profile of this 
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generation through their stories. My study of the intellectual policies 
of the CCP is mostly based on analyzing official documents published in 
China as well as a few secondary sources, 
I have used both a historical-descriptive approach and literary 
analysis in this thesis. Inspite of difficulty to find relevant 
references and data on the subject, I have still found original 
information in official and non-official sources in Chinese periodicals 
and newspapers, as well as books published in or outside China. Yet, 
because its approach is primarily qualitative with illustration on the 
basis of a case study of the generation in question (see Chapter 4)， 
the results of this thesis should only be regarded as preliminary and 
tentative. Nonetheless, I should be satisfied that the thesis can 
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PART I: State -
Intellectual Policy Of The PRC 
CHAPTER 2 
The Evolution of the Party-state's 
Policies Towards Intellectuals 
As mentioned before, how the party-state perceives the role of 
intellectuals in a socialist country is reflected in its policies on 
intellectuals. In addition, the CCP,s intellectual policy has greatly 
influenced the status and role of China's intellectuals. Furthermore, 
consciously or unconsciously, the attitudes of the Communist Party of 
China's (CCP) leadership and the policy thrust toward intellectuals 
affected intellectuals， own perceptions of their role. Therefore, a brief 
review of the policy, in particular the perception of the CCP leaders, is 
needed before we can go into the investigation of China's intellectuals. 
Besides studying the perceptions of the party-state on 
intellectuals, this chapter also helps examine the life situation of the 
generation of Chinese intellectuals that is as old as the Republic. Thus, 
this chapter helps elucidate the fates of this generation through an 
investigation of the complex political environment in which they have 
lived. 
How does the party-state perceive the role and the status of 
intellectuals? It is obvious that there has been a surprisingly different 
tone in propaganda about intellectuals before and after 1978. Whereas 
intellectuals had been regarded as enemies during Mao‘s rule, they were 
regarded as allies of the socialist revolution under Deng Xiaoping's 
leadership. Has the attitude of the CCP leadership really changed? To 
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answer, we must go back to the early stages of the CCP's intellectual 
policy. 
THE PARTY'S POLICIES TOWARD INTELLECTUALS BEFORE 1978 
Historically, the attitude of the CCP towards China's intellectuals 
has been rather contradictory. On one hand, they recognized that socialist 
construction needed the help of intellectuals. On the other hand, they 
looked down on intellectuals and regarded them as petty bourgeoisie.^ 
Consequently, the CCP's policy towards intellectuals fluctuated between 
valuing intellectuals highly and discriminating against them. 
Although Chinese intellectuals had participated in the founding of 
the CCP, they were rejected by the party as early as the Central Party's 
Expended Meeting in November 1927. Wang Ming and Zhang Guotao‘s "left" 
line policy declared that workers and peasants had to replace all 
2 
intellectuals cadres. According to Marxism-Leninism, Wang and Zhang 
suggested that intellectuals' thoughts were determined by which class they 
depended and served. Since most Chinese intellectuals served the 
bourgeoisie during that period, and the leftists demanded absolutely "pure 
revolutionary ranks", they regarded intellectuals as bourgeoisie and 
3 
refused to recruit them. 
The outbreak of Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) caused the CCP to 
realize the importance of recruiting intellectuals. The armed forces and 
base areas urgently needed intellectuals to help build hospitals and 
factories for munitions and daily necessities. In December 1939, Mao Tse-
tung, as the leader of CCP after the Zunyi Meeting, announced the decision 
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of the party about recruiting large numbers of intellectuals. This time 
Mao gave a positive appraisal of intellectuals and stressed that "without 
the participation of intellectuals, victory in the revolution is 
impossible. ’“ 
In his 1940 article "On Policy", Mao again encouraged the party 
members to co-operate with the intellectuals, even though they were 
bourgeois-liberalists: 
Bourgeois-liberal educators, men of letters, journalists, 
scholars and technical experts should be allowed to come to 
our base areas and co-operate with us in running schools and 
newspapers and doing other work. We should accept into our 
schools all intellectuals and students who show enthusiasm for 
resisting Japan, give them short-term training, and then 
assign them to work in the army, the government, or mass 
organizations; we^ could boldly draw them in, give them work 
and promote them. 1 
The policy won over a large number of intellectuals and strengthened 
the CCP during the War. Thus, right before the end of World War II， Mao 
reiterated the importance of intellectuals in his 1945 article "On 
Coalition Government": 
The problem of the intellectuals becomes particularly 
important in China because the country is culturally backward 
as a result of foreign and feudal oppression and because 
intellectuals are urgently needed in the people‘s struggle for 
liberation/ 
From this time forward, the CCP's policy toward intellectuals was 
dominated by Mao's perceptions about China's intellectuals. However, as 
Starr commented, Mao's view of intellectuals was highly ambiguous and even 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y / Even though he valued intellectuals highly during 七 h e 
Anti-Japanese War, Mao had never disregarded the class status of 
intellectuals. To him, "in class society everyone lives as a member of a 
particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is 
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stamped with the brand of a class. In other words, the thoughts and 
political positions of China's intellectuals might waver because of their 
family origin and social relations. But PRC also needed intellectuals to 
participate in socialist construction• Therefore ^  in the first few years 
after establishment of the PRC, the CCP still accepted intellectuals from 
every classes. Mao warned that the CCP should not be over-cautious or too 
afraid of reactionaries sneaking in: "Unavoidably, some such elements will 
creep in, but there will be time to comb them out in the course of study 
Q -
and work."‘ 
As a result, the Party put forward the "unity, education and 
remolding" policy for intellectuals. Before 1955, the policy was 
implemented mainly to unite intellectuals. During the Korean War in the 
early 1950s, the party also made use of this opportunity to mobilize the 
service of many urban intellectuals.^^ Communist plans use university and 
school newspapers, as well as hospital reports for propaganda -- and to 
insist on conformity in all expression -- received a tremendous boost from 
patriotic propaganda about Chinese deaths in Korea. This allowed the party 
to recruit a much broader spectrum of urban intellectuals to its cause 
than it had reached before 
However J Mao still requested that intellectuals be remoulded through 
the criticism of others and self-criticisms. During that period, most 
intellectuals were devoted to "remolding" their ideological 
1 2 
consciousness. Nonetheless, when such criticism touched the party and 
challenged its authority, Mao tightened the Party's control over 
intellectuals. The case of the "Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique" in 
1955 demonstrated that Mao's intention to remould intellectuals was not 
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simply an ideological problem. It was also a political problem. 
Hu Feng, a poet and a literature critic, wrote a letter with more 
than 300,000 words to Mao and the Party about the CCP's policy on art and 
literature. Mao apparently would not tolerated it. He began to "comb out" 
reactionary elements in the party. In 1955, he labelled Hu Feng and his 
"followers" as the "Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique.,山 Hii，s article 
of self-criticism became the evidence proving that he had anti-
revolutionary, anti-party, and anti-Mao Tse-tung intentions. Up to the end 
of 1956， 78 persons, including 32 party members, were put in jail. Party-
state officials investigated the lives of more than one thousand people 
because of the case.^^ 
Although, Zhou En-lai held a conference in early 1956 on the 
question of intellectuals, proposing to recognize them as part of working 
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class, and value highly their will and ability to work for the country, 
Mao's discrimination against intellectuals kept their status low. 
The Anti-Rightist Campaign 
The Anti-Rightist Campaign further demonstrated Mao，s intolerance of 
intellectuals's criticism of the party and challenges to his leadership. 
In late 1956, Mao launched the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom 
and a hundred schools of thought contend". This policy ostensibly aimed to 
help reform the party. It encouraged intellectuals to criticize and to 
give advice to the party. Many intellectuals, including university 
students, took the invitation sincerely and began criticizing the party. 
They believed that their behaviour would be endorsed by the party. 
Nonetheless, in May 1957, Mao wrote an article entitled "Things are 
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Changing", and distributed it to some cadres. The article pointed out 
that, 
There are a large number of new intellectual members in our 
party (even more in the league). Some of them really have 
serious revisionist thoughts....They support capitalist 
liberalism and object to the leadership of the party. They 
agree with democracy and object to centralization They 
cooperate with the 'rightist' intellectuals in society, joined 
them, and treated them as close as brothers. 
By June 1957, the Anti-Rightist Campaign began. The intellectuals， advices 
to the Party and criticism of its policies was transformed into evidence 
to prove their thinking was "rightist". As a result of this campaign, more 
than 500,000 people were labelled as bourgeois rightists"^^ and the vast 
majority of them were intellectuals. This movement not only affected the 
lives of intellectuals, but extended the condemning labels to their 
families. 
Mao ^  s attitude on intellectuals 
Mao's prejudice intellectuals was based on several ideological 
assumptions. First of all, according to Marxism, the world outlook of 
intellectuals was capitalist because most of them came from exploiting-
class families, had been educated in traditional schools, and had lived in 
the "old society" (i.e. the capitalist society). They retained to varying 
degrees the views of the exploiting classes and other non-proletarian 
ideas. Mao believed that this was true in China, and this Weltanschauung， 
or world view, made the intellectuals ill suited for the demand of the 
socialist revolution and construction. Their world outlook could not be 
changed 
Secondly, Mao regarded the relationship between the state and 
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intellectuals as that of skin to fur. In the "old days" before 1949， 
Chinese intellectuals had been attached like fur to the skin of 
imperialist, feudalist ownership and capitalist ownership. After the 
socialist revolution, this intellectuals fur had to attached itself to the 
new proletariat skin, but most of them were unwilling to do so.^^ 
Thirdly, Mao thought the relationship between workers and peasants, 
and the intellectuals should be that of a patron and client. Since 
intellectuals were employed by the workers and peasants after the 
socialist revolution, they had to follow the orders of their employer; 
otherwise, they would be unemployed. The status of intellectuals was lower 
20 
than workers and peasants. 
Finally Mao said, "the lowly are the most intelligent; the elite are 
the most ignorant". As the lowly represented workers and peasants and the 
elite represented intellectuals, the saying indicated that Mao looked down 
on intellectuals. He also criticized them for being too proud because they 
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believed themselves superior. Making the same point in 1942, he said, 
1 
I 
Many intellectuals fancy themselves very learned and assume 
airs of erudition without realizing that such airs are bad and 
harmful and hinder their own progress. They ought to be aware 
of the truth, that actually many so-called intellectuals are, 
relatively speaking, most ignorant and ”the workers and 
peasants sometimes know more than they do. 
This view might have originated in Mao's maxim that "knowledge comes from 
direct experience", found in his article "On Practice": 
If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of 
changing reality. . • .All genuine knowledge originates in direct 
experience....Anyone who denies such perceptions, denies 
direct experience or denies personal participation in the 
practice that changes reality, is not a jjaterialist.•••There 
can be no knowledge apart from practice. 
Besides, Mao said intellectuals more easily alter their class 
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principles because they had been under the influence of the capitalist 
class for a long time. Therefore, intellectuals should be integrated 
with the working people and be remoulded through physical works.^^ 
Such perceptions of Mao became the theoretical basis of the CCP，s 
intellectual policy in subsequent years. Most of China's intellectuals 
were distrusted and became the targets of the dictatorship. During the 
following "Great Leap Forward", the party sent many rightist intellectuals 
"down" to villages and rural areas to be ideologically remoulded by the 
proletariat. This was known as the "xia-fang" policy. 
However, the failures of the Great Leap Forward and the agricultural 
disaster that followed in the early 1960s forced CCP leaders to seek the 
cooperation of intellectuals in order to ”revive" China's economy. This 
gave a few open-minded leaders in the CCP the opportunity to improve the 
situation of China* s intellectuals. In March 1962, at the national 
conferences on science and technology and on drama held in Guangzhou, 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice-Premier Chen Yi proposed that intellectuals 
1 
should be "honoured, not vilified"； their labels as bourgeois rightists 
should be removed and they should be portrayed as intellectuals of the 
or 
working people."' Zhou and Chen's effort to change the 1957 policy and 
unite with the intellectuals again did raise the enthusiasm of 
intellectuals to work for the state. A great deal of important scientific 
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researches progressed in those years. 
Nevertheless, Mao's prejudiced attitude towards intellectuals still 
dominated even though he was more tolerant and respect of technologists 
and scientists. Classifying China's intellectuals according to their 
willingness to accept socialism, he said, "the technical personnel are the 
33 
best, the scientists the next, whereas those who study liberal arts are 
, ,28 
the w o r s t . Industrial technologists were "better" because their studies 
"were close to reality". Intellectuals studying pure science were 
comparatively worse, but still better than those studying liberal arts, 
who knew the least about the world, despite studying economics or 
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history. Mao's concept of "red and expert" intellectuals -- an 
intellectual who was politically indoctrinated (red) and professionally 
trained (expert) -- was applied less to scientists and technologists than 
to writers and artists. The -anxiety Mao felt about students of liberal 
arts might have grown from fear that writers and artists could influence 
the thinking of masses in ways that might be dangerous to the party.⑶ 
Thus in 1963, Mao started a campaign to reform literature and the 
arts. He criticized the All China Federation of Literary and Art Circles 
and their journals for not implementing the party's policies over the 
previous fifteen years. He even declared that, unless the groups remoulded 
themselves, they would at some point develop groups like the infamous j 
i n i 
Hungarian Petofi C l u b . N o n e t h e l e s s , Mao's dissatisfaction with the state 
of literature and art did not cause serious problems for the artists and 
writers until 1966. However, his stress of the bourgeois characteristics 
of China's intellectuals and general doctrine, "never forgetting class 
struggles" served to dampen the enthusiasm of intellectuals. 
Intellectuals in the Cultural Revolution 
Then the Cultural Revolution broke out beginning the ten-years' 
agony of China's intellectuals. The tone set in the Anti-Rightist Movement 
was heightened and brought to a conclusion in the Cultural Revolution. 
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In May 1966，Mao issued the "May 16 Circular,"'^ which stated the 
aims and nature of the cultural Revolution. It declared that the Cultural 
Revolution was "a life-and-death class struggle". It aimed to expose 
completely the capitalist reactionary stand of those "academic 
authorities" and to "totally criticize the capitalist reactionary thought 
of academic circles, educational circles, journalism, cultural circles and 
press circles." Moreover, it also aimed to "seize the leadership of these 
cultural areas." Therefore, the party had to criticize and liquidate "all 
the capitalist representatives who had sneaked into the party, government, 
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army and cultural circles.,. In essence, most of the intellectuals were 
regarded as reactionary and became the targets of the revolution. 
During the time of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four's control, and the 
widespread ultra-left influence, the status of intellectuals fell even 
further. One of the most notorious doctrine of the Gang of Four claimed 
that "the more knowledge one possesses, the more reactionary he or she 




class enemies, a derogatory title which placed them after the eight 
"targets of proletariat dictatorship", namely landlords, rich peasants, 
counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, renegades, enemy agents 
and capitalist-roaders. Almost all the intellectuals suffered badly during 
the Cultural Revolution, Even ordinary primary-school teachers became 
targets, not to mention many well-known intellectuals. Some of them 
endured terrible humiliations and maltreatment: they were beaten, made to 
kneel (sometimes over bits of broken glass), jailed or isolated and force 
to clean toilets, pulling grass. Many were persecuted to death. Their 
families were broken and their children were viewed as "sons of 35 
bitches” 
Not only were thinkers condemned, thinking was too. The ten years of 
turmoil from 1966 to 1976 was definitely a tragedy of measured by the 
production of intellectual and artistic works. The entire country's 
consumption of dramatic performances was limited to eight "model 
theatrical pieces"; literature was restricted to socialist realism of the 
most sterile variety; the political messages of movies were their sole 
content and people were forced to attend. 
Schools and universities were disrupted even severely and for a 
longer period. Millions of intellectuals, including professors, 
technocrats J school teachers, and students, were sent "up to the mountains 
and down to the villages". In order to be remoulded and re-educated by the 
proletariat, intellectuals had to work with farmers, and their 
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professional works were not allowed to be performed. Ironically, but in 
keeping with the nature of China's Communist revolution, intellectuals 
were remoulded mainly by farmers in rural districts, not by urban workers. 
Mao ^  s viewpoints on education 
The disruptions experienced by the educational system were due to 
Mao's viewpoints about the political role of education. Even before 1966， 
Mao said China's educational system of China needed reform. He said the 
length of schooling should be shortened. The courses were too heavy, and 
teaching and examination methods "destroyed the experts and youths". Mao 
said students should not read too many books, even those on Marxism, or 
"they would become bookworms, dogmatists or revisionists." "Thee more 
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books they read, the more foolish they were," he said. 
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Mao also said China's tertiary system was unrealistic. After 
studying for twenty years, students "had not seen how the workers worked, 
how the farmers cultivated, how people sold and purchased". They knew 
nothing about the real w o r l d / Therefore, the system also had to be 
reformed, in particular the study liberal arts. Students of the latter had 
to get involved in society to learn industry, agriculture and commerce, 
spend less time in schools. Those studying science and technology were 
different. Because they worked in factories and did experiments.冗 
However, medical education needed change. Mao thought modern medical 
science's means of diagnosis and treatment were unsuitable for China's 
rural areas. Because medical personnel working for the peasants, China，s 
majority, they should spend less time studying and instead learn from real 
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experience. 
Teachers had to go to the countryside as well. Mao argued that it 
was not enough to use lecture notes to teach. Rather, teachers should "do 




arts and history could be taught in outdoors； formal buildings were not 
necessary•⑶ As a result, examinations were abolished; schools and 
libraries were closed. "Marxism - Leninism - Mao Tse-tung thought 
propaganda teams” were sent in to control the schools. Students were 
encouraged to travel throughout China to establish "revolutionary ties" 
with other provinces. 
Nonetheless, Mao still thought that sciences and technologies were 
necessary to China's development. In 1968, he wrote: 
It is still necessary to have universities, here I refer 
mainly to universities of science and technology. But the 
length of schooling must be shortened. The education should be 
revolutionary and put proletarian politics in 
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command Students should be selected from experienced 
workers and peasants and they should return to production 
after they have studied a few years in the schools/^ 
The statement suggest that the tertiary education system should be 
transformed into short-term technical training courses. It emphasized 
informal education and rejected the need for well-educated technologists, 
not to say high-level intellectuals. 
Thus, when institutions of higher learning reopened in 1970, 
universities only admitted candidates who were "workers, peasants or 
soldiers". They could only be nominated and recommended by their work 
units, based on their political attitude, performance and family origins. 
Finale of Mao's China 
The "Two Appraisals," included in the "Summary of the National 
Conference on Education” issued under the gang of Four，s influence and 
said to have Mao's approval, completely denied the importance of China's 
education system and its achievements since the establishment of the PRC. 
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It declared that Mao* s proletarian education line had not been 
implemented; instead, the bourgeoisie had exercised dictatorship over the 
proletariat. In addition, it said the world view of most intellectuals 
were fundamentally bourgeois. It even classified as bourgeoisie those 
intellectuals from worker and peasant families, who had been trained in 
socialist China. 
Consequently, the whole country came to look down on the value of 
knowledge and skills. Youths lacked opportunities for formal education; 
economic development was seriously retarded and society was in chaos. 
The death of Mao Tse-tung and the downfall of the Gang of Four ended 
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China's ten years of turmoil. But the ordeals of intellectuals did not 
stop immediately; Mao's views on intellectuals and knowledge still 
remained influential. The new leader of the CCP, Hua Guofeng, announced 
the "two whateverists" doctrine, meaning the party would follow whatever 
10 
Mao had decided and instructed. As a result, the CCP's policy towards 
intellectuals was not altered until 1978. 
POLICIES TOWARD INTELLECTUALS AFTER 1978 
For China's intellectuals, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the CCP in 1978 was a major turning point. After the 
session, the party began to acknowledging the important role intellectuals 
play in China's development. Under Deng Xiao-ping，s leadership, the party 
aimed to rekindle the enthusiasm of intellectuals to work for China's 
modernization. 
Even though Deng assumed absolute political leadership in late 1978， 
he began changing the party's policy towards intellectuals in 1977. In a 
talk with two leading comrades of the CCP Central Committee, Deng 
anticipated that， 
We must create within the party an atmosphere of respect for 
knowledge and respect for trained personnel. The erroneous 
attitude of not respecting intellectuals must be opposed. All 
work, be it mental or manual, is labour. Those who engage in 
mental work are also workers....Great importance should be 
attached to knowledge and to those who engage“in mental 
labour, and they should be recognized as workers. 
Then, in a speech to the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central 
Committee of the CCP in July 1977, Deng called for "correctly 
understanding" Mao Tse-tung thought. His speech stressed the need to "seek 
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truth from facts" and "utilize all positive factors to achieve the four 
modernizations by the end of this c e n t u r y " T h a t is to say, Mao's 
thought should be reviewed in order to find the "real" Marxist-Leninist 
and Maoist perspective thought on intellectuals. The policy should be 
based on China's reality and needs, namely the urgent need to achieve the 
Four Modernizations. 
Two months later, Deng talked with leading cadres of the Ministry of 
Education. He pointed out 七 h a t the party "should have a correct and 
comprehensive understanding Mao Zedong Thought as a s y s t e m " •“ Thus, the 
"Two Appraisals" included in the "Summary of the National Conference on 
Education" should be criticised and right distinguished from wrong, 
because "a lot of the ideas peddled by the Gang of Four were injected into 
it", and some of the Mao's statements were garbled in the context/? In 
other words, intellectuals， status should be redefined. When Deng resumed 
power in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the 
CCP, his ideas about intellectual and intellectuals became guidelines for 
I 
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subsequent CCP's policy. 
Re-evaluating the intellectuals and knowledge 
The most crucial part of the policy re-evaluated the importance of 
the intellectuals and re-defined their position in socialist China. Since 
the new leadership emphasized that the policy was a development of 
Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung Thought, they also sought a 
theoretical basis for their new approach in the ideas of Marx, Engels and 
Lenin on the intellectuals. 
First of all, the party reassessed the value of knowledge. Instead 
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of being regarded as the product of capitalism, science and technology 
were viewed as indispensable elements of modernization. In a speech at the 
opening ceremony of the National Science Conference in 1978, Deng said 
that, "the key to the Four Modernizations is the modernization of science 
and technology." Deng justified this position by stating that "Marxism 
has consistently treated science and technology as part of the productive 
forces," and increased productivity is mainly due to the power of science 
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and technology. Therefore, knowledge should be respected as an essential 
pre-requisite of the development of science and technology, which in turn 
was the crux of modernization. 
Not only was knowledge valued highly; intellectuals were respected 
by Marx and Lenin too as Deng suggested. In the above speech, Deng further 
affirmed that the only difference between workers who used their brains 
and those who used their hands was the different roles assigned to them. 
Thus, the intellectuals were a part of the proletariat, because they also 
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worked under the rule of the exploiting class in the old society. These 
ideas were elaborated later on. An article published in People，s Daily 
(Ren-min Ri-bao) on January 4， 1970, said intellectuals should be treated 
members of the working class."" Another article in People s Daily on April 
18, 1980 reiterated that the correct Guiding Principle of Marxism towards 
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the intellectuals was what Zhou En-lai proposed in 1956 : that socialist 
construction had to rely on the cooperation of workers, peasants and 
intellectuals; most of China's intellectuals had become part of the 
working class; and the working and living conditions of intellectuals 
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should be improved. 
Another noteworthy speech echoing Deng's declaration on working-
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class intellectuals was delivered by Hu Yaobang, the former party 
secretary, on the centennial of Karl Marx's death. Hu said that, although 
intellectuals' background were bourgeois or petty-bourgeois, most of those 
remaining from the pre-revolutionary era were at least anti-imperialist 
and patriotic, and some of them had even supported the revolution. 
Furthermore, intellectuals trained since 1949 accounted for more than 90 
per cent of the total number of the existing intellectuals and should no 
doubt be regarded as part of the proletariat. In addition, "according to 
their source of income and who they serve, our country's intellectuals 
have already become part of the working c l a s s . T h e difference in their 
work and that of the proletariat is that between mental and manual labour, 
which Marxism predicts will eventually disappear，" 
Policies to solve intellectuals， problems 
Since mental workers were so important to modernization the CCP 
leadership insisted that intellectuals be cherished and be given better 
t 
working and living conditions. Therefore, several policies were carried 
out in an attempt to solve the intellectuals problems, most of which were 
a legacy off the Cultural Revolution. 
Besides emphasizing that intellectuals were members of the working 
class and important for modernization, the party also set procedures for 
removing the "rightists" labels many had acquired during the Cultural 
Revolution. This was officially announced in the document, "Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the 
People's Republic of C h i n a , i n mid-1981. By 1982， over 90 per cent of 
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the ”rightists" were able to remove their noxious hats. 
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The leadership repeatedly called for more attention to be paid to 
intellectuals' living and working conditions. In 1980, for example, Deng 
said that, 
Our teachers and scientists are faced with many difficulties 
in their living conditions, which urgently need to be 
overcome. Many intellectuals who are very capable earn well 
under 100 yuan a month. Given slightly better working and 
living conditions, they would be able to solve many more 
problems for the 炉 a t e and the people, and create immense 
additional wealth. 
In order to increase intellectuals， income, the party said it would 
distribute rewards according to the principle of "from each according to 
his ability, to each according to his labour." Moreover, the leadership 
also tried to explain that mental labour belonged to the category of 
highly productive complex labour, which created more surplus value for 
society. Thus, mental labour should receive a higher salary than physical 
labour. "It suits the law of socialist economics and benefits the people," 
cn 
Chen Yun said广 
Regarding working conditions, Hu Yaobang also required the party "to 
give full support to scientists and scientific workers in their efforts to 
f 1 
work out their grand projects.“ 
In 1978 J Deng had recommended that scientists and technicians should be 
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allowed to concentrate all their energies on their professional work. 
Later on, another p a r t y leader, Nie Rong-zhen, also pointed out that it 
was necessary to assign jobs for intellectuals which were appropriate to 
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their professions. 
As a result, work was reassigned according to intellectuals' skills 
and abilities. Those who were forced to retire during the Cultural 
Revolution could resume their jobs and research if they wanted. Their 
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administrative and political workloads were reduced so that intellectuals 
could concentrate on professional tasks•“ Problems regarding housing 
shortages, medical care and entertainment facilities for intellectuals 
also received the attention of the government.^^ Considering the financial 
problems facing by mainland China at that moment, the improvements made 
were noteworthy, although far from what the leadership had promised. 
The party also encouraged the promotion of competent party and non-
party intellectuals to leading positions, and the recruitment of 
‘ fifi 
intellectuals into the party. Hu Yao-bang's speech at the Congress of 
the Chinese Scientific and Technical Association explained that, although 
China had an 18-million person contingent of cadres, quite a number of 
them were either not qualified or not well-qualified. On the other hand, 
the great majority of intellectuals had not been promoted to responsible 
posts, so their ability had not yet been fully used. This situation had to 
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be improved. Furthermore, the necessity of building "a large contingent 
of revolutionary, well-educated, professionally competent and younger 一 
‘ flQ 
cadres" urged the party to recruit more younger intellectuals. In China, 
Party membership is a sign of status and recognition. It has always been 
the aim of many people. However, during major political campaigns, 
acquiring CCP membership was extremely difficult for intellectuals. Thus, 
granting it was a way of arousing intellectuals' inspiration to work 
harder for the nation. 
Furthermore, the system of conferring titles on intellectuals in 
universities, colleges and research institutes was restored and improved. 
In late 1979, China's State Council passed temporary regulations on the 
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proper titles of engineering and technical cadres. And on February 12, 
44 
1980， the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress endorsed 
regulations for awarding the academic degrees of doctor, master and 
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bachelor.' Details of procedures for granting degrees were not made 
public until inid-1981, when China granted its first doctorate/^ The 
classification system was later applied to scientists, technicians, 
professors, teachers, medical doctors, journalists, agricultural 
technicians and even social science researchers. 
Because the party repeatedly claimed intellectuals as part of the 
working class, those intellectuals who made outstanding contributions were 
given honours and citations similar to those given workers and peasants. 
In 1982，Bei.iing Review reported that 94 intellectuals from central 
China's Hunan province were given the title "model worker" by the 
provincial government. Many intellectuals in other provinces and 
municipalities had also been named as "model" or "advanced worker. 
Allowing intellectuals more autonomy in their work was another key 
aspect of ,the CCP's revamped policy. One of the main messages emerging 
from the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee was that 
people should "liberate their thought" from ultra-leftist ideology. Deng's 
pragmatic slogan, "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth,” also 
encouraged intellectuals to think freely. He also warned party cadres at 
all levels not to interfere with artists' work. However, the Sixth 
Plenary Session of the 11th Party Committee in 1981 subsequently set some 
boundaries on intellectual and artistic freedom. The Four Cardinal 
75 
Principles set the standard of "freedom" intellectuals could enjoy. In 
other words, only when they followed the Four Cardinal Principles, could 
they liberate their thoughts without being regarded as "bourgeois 
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liberals." Above all, it seemed that the economic-scientific sphere was 
allowed more leeway than the literary-ideological sphere. 
The policy appeared to follow ideas proposed by Zhou En-lai in 
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1956. Nevertheless, the limitations and requirements set by the party 
and various party-state policy in the 1980s, all manifested the intention 
of CCP leaders; in order to maintain the Leninst party-state, they would 
stop any intellectual who tried to challenge China's existing political 
order. 
Cool Winds: 1981-1984 
In 1981, CCP leaders thoroughly criticized the screenplay, 
"Unrequited Love," written by an artist serving the army, Bai Hua.^^ It 
was because there was a controversial question asked at the end of the 
play: "you love this country so much … b u t does this country love you?!” 
The leadership thought that it was wrong to ask such question because 
people should love and do everything for their motherland, which has 
I 
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nursed, cultivated and educated them. Although Bai Hua merely needed to 
write a letter criticizing himself for not distinguishing the current 
socialist state from that controlled by the "Gang of Four，"" this event 
showed that the writers could not express themselves with complete 
freedom. 
Following the criticism of "Unrequited Love,” the CCP leaders 
launched a campaign against "Spiritual Pollution." Beginning in early 
1983, several articles printed in People’s Daily warned people to be aware 
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of "Spiritual Pollution" from capitalism. Although the campaign was 
supposed to be limited to party members and did not last long, it 
46 
influenced the intellectual community. The party said all intellectuals 
who dealt with ideological subjects, including teachers, theoreticians, 
academics, journalists and artists bore responsibility for "liquidating" 
• 8 1 
this pollution. Later on, Deng Xiaoping himself pointed out that 
"Spiritual Pollution" could be found in the theoretical, cultural and 
artist circle. He said the aim of those who worked in theoretical areas 
was to criticize socialism and that their research had deviated from the 
Marxist road. Writers were interested in writing sad and negative stories. 
They failed to solve the problems of socialist modernization and they 
denied the leadership of socialism and the party, the main themes of the 
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Four Cardinal Principles. 
Fortunately, this campaign merely lasted for only a short period for 
it had a negative effect on intellectuals，motivation to work. The party 
was forced to stop their criticism and began a second "Hundred Flowers 
P o l i c y .』 
i I 
I 
Warm Winds: 1985-1986 
When the party-state loosened its reins and encouraged the 
expression of diverse viewpoints, many intellectuals who expressed their 
views went beyond the party's limits. The Fourth Congress of the Chinese 
Writers‘ Association in late December 1984 and early January 1985， 
provided opportunities for the writers to express their opinions and to 
ask for more freedom in literature, art academic research and 
flj 
publication. Comment grew louder and louder in early 1985, which caused 
other intellectual groups, especially the journalists, to make the same 
demand. This situation evoked a reaction even from China's reform-minded 
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leaders. Hu Yaobang stated unequivocally that there could not be "freedom 
of the press" because the press had to be "the mouthpiece of the party." 
Therefore, it should publicize the "bright and hopeful," and at least 80 
percent good things because this was the "mainstream of Chinese society." 
Moreover, before reporting important news, the journalists had to seek 
nc 
permission from higher authorities. Hu reaffirmed the necessity of party 
censorship of the press. 
However, in spite of these limitation intellectuals found warmer 
political weather in 1985 and 1986. It might have been because Hu was' 
sympathetic with intellectuals. Yet, the younger intellectuals, in 
particular the university students, were dissatisfied with these 
limitations on freedom. They went to the streets to protest the corruption 
of cadres and to call for democracy, liberty, and freedom of press. The 
student demonstration advocating democracy in late 1986 resulted in the 
"anti-Bourgeois Liberalization" campaign the next year. 
I 
The Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization: 1987-1989 
Acting on the instruction of Deng Xiao-ping, People's Daily 
published an article on the first day of 1987 accusing the some cadres of 
not acting strongly enough against bourgeois liberalization. It also 
warned that adopting bourgeois liberalization meant denial of the 
QP 
socialist system. Few days later, the editorial of People，s Daily said 
the people should take a "clear stance and firm attitude to oppose 
oy 
bourgeois liberalization. ‘ Then, on January 16, 1987, Hu Yao-bang was 
forced to resign from the post of general secretary of the CCP at an 
enlarged meeting of the party Central Committee's politburo because he did 
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not exercise effective leadership in the fight against bourgeois 
liberalization. 
Some renowned intellectuals were affected by this campaign, in 
particular those who were ideologically alienated and influential with 
students or the intellectual community. For example, Fan Lizhi， Wang 
Ruowang, and Liu Bingyan all were expelled from the party and removed from 
their posts after being accused of bourgeois liberalization and denying 
89 
the leadership of the CCP. But they did not suffer from persecution as 
severe as that inflicted on intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution. 
By contrast, they still were able to work and express their opinions. 
However, the party also banned or criticized some newspapers, periodicals, 
90 
books and movies that advocated liberalization and Western democracy. 
This restricted artistic creation. 
Fearing that the anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign might harm 
91 
the economic reform, ‘ reformist party leaders placed some restrictions 
on the campaign. They limited the campaign to the party and in the 
political-ideological sphere； it was not to affect the CCP's economic 
reform and rural policies, scientific and technological research, 
literature and art or peoples‘ daily lives; the rural areas were to be 
spared, as were the ’，democratic parties" and intellectuals outside the 
CCP. 
In order to maintain intellectuals， willingness to work for the Four 
Modernizations, the leadership took pains to reassure scientists and 
technologists. The party emphasized it would continue the "Hundred Flowers 
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Policy,，under the premise of adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles. 
Furthermore, Zhao Ziyang , as the party secretary, met with and praised 
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some technocrats, and reiterated that the party's intellectual policy 
would not be changed. In the summer of 1987, Zhao, in the name of the 
party, invited several middle-aged scientists who had made great 
contributions to the Four Modernizations, to the seaside of Beidihe to 
recuperate. It was the first time in the PRC， history that intellectuals 
had been invited to the resort retreat of top party officials 
Although the reformist leadership were more tolerant of intellectual 
activities, the anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign continued.^^ By 
1989， this campaign became another extremely cold wind blowing over the 
intellectual community. The campaign dramatically escalated after the 
June-Fourth Massacre in Beijing， an event which shocked the whole world. 
Not only had the government's suppression of the democracy activists in 
and around Tiananmen Square cost several hundred lives; never before had 
the regime been so seriously confronted with such a shrewd and tenacious 
opposition, who mainly consisted of university students and merely used 
peaceful means to protest. 
To the conservatives within the leadership, the 1989‘s student 
unrest caused frightening turmoil and chaos in Chinese society. Most 
important of all, it challenged the legitimacy of the party. Above all, 
because students and intellectuals were more closely united than before, 
the regime thought that it was rapidly losing control in the face of a 
96 
tide of bourgeois liberal thought. 
The incident manifested the political intentions of Deng Xiao-ping's 
intellectual policy. From Deng's viewpoint, maintaining stability is of 
paramount importance for the success of the Reform and the Four 
q fj 
Modernizations program. On the one hand, Deng needs the co-operation of 
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the intellectuals; thus, the policy tries to encourage the talents of as 
many intellectuals as possible. On the other hand, he wants to preserve 
Marxisra-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought in order to maintain the Leninist 
party-state regime; therefore, liberal thought is not tolerated because it 
leads to questioning of the legitimacy of the party-state, hence 
challenging the power and authority of the leadership.^^ Moreover, the CCP 
leadership said the liberal ideas that led to the student movements in 
1986 and 1987 is also one of the "destabilizing elements" which may cause 
no 
turmoil and damage to China. Under the premise of stability, the 
intellectuals' policy constricted again after the June-Fourth Massacre. 
Some of the best-known intellectuals, who had added their voices to 
support the students in the spring of 1989, had to leave China by legal or 
illegal means to avoid the government's campaign of suppression.議 Their 
books and other intellectual works were banned. Those who could not leave 
China were put in jail. 
Even though the leadership has repeatedly promised and restated 
later that since 1978， the government's policy towards intellectuals has 
not been and will not be changed,皿 Deng leadership has continued Mao's 
1 0 2 
zig-zag approach to the treatment of intellectuals. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The CCP's policy towards intellectuals has followed a pattern of 
repression, liberalization followed by more repression since 1949. Echoing 
this rhythm China's intellectuals have fluctuated between hope and 
despair, even in the Reform period in the 1980s. Although Deng Xiao-
51 
ping's policy is more moderate than Mao's, he has not gone beyond the idea 
of treating intellectuals as the "means" to modernization, a notion that 
also prevailed in the 1950s. For the past ten years, the experiences of 
China's intellectuals suggests that their autonomy was still limited and 
intermittent, although somewhat expanded. The periodic campaigns are 
another form of ideological constraint on intellectuals, which prevent 
them from becoming vacillating elements and dissenters vis-a-vis the 
Party. 
In other words, the party-state still requires intellectuals to be 
patriotic and devote themselves to socialist modernization. Moreover, they 
must accept the leadership of the CCP. Therefore, from the party's 
point of view the role of intellectuals has not changed since the founding 
of the People's Republic. Mao's words at the 1942, at the Yanan forum 
still hold true: 
All revolutionary literary and art workers should learn from 
the example of Lu Hsun and be "oxen" for the proletariat and 
the丨慨sses， bending their backs to the task until their dying 
day. 
According to the party, intellectuals should be hard working and obedient 
beasts of burden, eating grass but producing milk. State-intellectuals 
relations remain the same； intellectuals are the "fur" on "skin" of 
socialist China. 
This chapter gives a profile of the political environment of China's 
intellectuals over the past 40 years. Although the "open policy" of the 
1980s has brought some hope to intellectuals, the hard political reality 
has forced them to begin thinking more independently. They have also 
become increasingly independent in exerting pressure on the party; many of 
them even try to seek a new road for China. How do China's intellectuals, 
52 
in particular "the generation as old as the Republic," perceive their role 
and act under the current conditions? These questions are the subject of 
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n o t e 4 7 in C h a p t e r 1 . 
3 5 . T h i s w a s a l s o t h e e x p e r i e n c e of m y g r a n d f a t h e r , a f a m o u s 
h e r b a l i s t , a f t e r b e i n g p e r s e c u t e d a l m o s t to d e a t h , he w a s f o r c e d to 
w o r k a s a f a r m e r a n d l i v e d a l o n e in h i s l a t e f i f t y in r u r a l a r e a . 
M o s t of h i s c h i l d r e n h a d t o go to the v i l l a g e s a n d s t a y e d t h e r e 
t o o . 
3 6 . M a o Z e d o n g ” C h u n - j i e Tan-hua Ji-yao ( S u m m a r y of the T a l k s 
in t h e S p r i n g F e s t i v a l ) " ( F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 6 4 ) , W a n - s u i ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 
p p . 4 5 8 - 4 6 5； a n d ”Zai Hanzhou de Jiang-hua { S p e e c h e s i n H a n z h o u )“ 
( D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 6 5 ) , W a n - s u i (1967)， p . 3 2 . 
3 7 . M a o Z e d o n g , “ Z a i Hanzhou de Jiang-hua, “ o p . c i t . , p . 3 2 ; and 
“Jie-J ian Nipoer, . .," o p « c i t . , p . 5 6 8 . 
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3 8 • I b i d .，” Z a i Hanzhou. . .,“ p p . 3 2 - 3 3 . 
3 9 . M a o Z e d o n g , ''Dui Wei-sheng Gong-zuo de Zhi-si ( I n s t r u c t i o n s 
o n t h e S a n i t a r y W o r k s ) " ( J u n e 2 6 , 1 9 6 5 ) , W a n - s u i (1969)， p p . 6 1 5 -
616. 
4 0 .Mao Z e d o n g , “ Zai Hanzhou …，” o p . c i t . . p . 3 3 ; a n d ''He Mao 
Yuanxin de Tan-hua ( S p e a k to M a o Y u a n x i n ) " ( M a r c h 1 9 6 4 ) , W a n - s u i 
( 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 4 7 0 . 
4 1 • R e n - m i n R i - b a o ( h e r e a f t e r R M R B ) , J u l y 2 2 , 1968， p . 1 . 
• 4 2 . S i P i n g , Z h i - s h i F e n - z i d e L i - s h i Y u n - d o n g h e Z u o - y o n g (The 
H i s t o r i c a l M o v e m e n t s a n d F u n c t i o n s of I n t e l l e c t u a l s ) ( S h a n g h a i : 
S h a n g h a i S h e - h u i K e - x u e Y u a n C h u - b a n S h e , 1988)， p . 1 1 8 . 
4 3 . S e e i b i d . , p p . 1 1 9 - 1 2 2 . 
4 4 . D e n g X i a o p i n g , " R e s p e c t K n o w l e d g e , R e s p e c t T r a i n e d 
P e r s o n n e l， " S e l e c t e d W o r k s of D e n g X i a o - p i n g ( 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 2 ) ( B e i j i n g : 
F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P r e s s , 1983)， p . 5 4 . 
4 5 . D e n g X i a o p i n g , " M a o Z e d o n g T h o u g h t m u s t b e C o r r e c t l y 
U n d e r s t o o d a s I n t e g r a l W h o l e , " i b i d .， p p . 5 6 - 6 0 . 
4 6 . D e n g X i a o p i n g , " S e t t i n g T h i n g s R i g h t in E d u c a t i o n " 
( S e p t e m b e r 19， 1977)， i b i d . , p . 8 1 . 
4 7 . I b i d . , p p . 8 0 - 8 1 . 
4 8 . T h e p e r c e p t i o n s of M a r x , E n g e l s , L e n i n , S t a l i n a n d M a o Ze-
d o n g o n i n t e l l e c t u a l s w e r e r e p e a t e d l y p r i n t e d in a n d o r q u o t e d b y 
t h e m a s s m e d i a . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e w a s a l i s t of t h e i r v i e w s in 
G o n g - r e n R i - b a o , J a n u a r y 5 , 1983， p . 1 ; a n d s e e a l s o L u n Z h i - s h i he 
Z h i - s h i F e n - z i ( T r e a t i s e o n K n o w l e d g e a n d I n t e l l e c t u a l s ) , ( B e i j i n g : 
Z h o n g - g o n g Z h o n g - y a n D a n - x i a o , 1 9 8 3 ) . 
4 9 . D e n g X i a o p i n g , " S p e e c h at N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e C o n f e r e n c e " 
( M a r c h 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 )， S e l e c t e d W o r k s of D e n g X i a o p i n g ( 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 2 ), 
o p . c i t .， p . 1 0 2 . 
5 0 . I b i d . , p . 1 0 3 . 
5 1 . I b i d .， p p . 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . 
5 2 . T h e t e x t e n t i t l e d a s " C o m p r e h e n s i v e l y a n d A c c u r a t e l y 
u n d e r s t a n d t h e P a r t y ' s p o l i c y t o w a r d s I n t e l l e c t u a l s " , w a s 
t r a n s l a t e d a n d r e p r i n t e d in Bei.iing R e v i e w , no . 5， F e b r u a r y 2， 1 9 7 9， 
p p . 1 0 - 1 5 . 
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53 . C o m m e n t a r y in R M R B , ''Dui-dai Zhi-shi Fen-zi de Ma-ke-si 
^hu-yi Fang-zhen ( M a r x i s t G u i d i n g P r i n c i p l e s o n t h e T r e a t m e n t of 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s ) , " R M R B， A p r i l 1 8， 1 9 8 0， p . 2 . F o r t h e t e x t of Z h o u ' s 
p r o p o s a l , s e e Z h o u E n - l a i J i a o - y u W a n - x u a n . o p . c i t . , p p . 1 0 2 - 1 3 9 . 
5 4 . R M R B , s u p r a n o t e 5 3 . 
55.Hu，s s p e e c h , " T h e R a d i a n c e of t h e G r e a t T r u t h of M a r x i s m 
L i g h t s O u r W a y Forward,“ is r e p r i n t e d in B e i j i n g R e v i e w , n o . 1 2 , 
M a r c h 2 1 , 1 9 8 3 , c e n t r e f o l d p p . I - X V ; see a l s o L u o F u , " C h i n a ' s 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s -- P a r t of t h e W o r k i n g C l a s s , " Bei.iing R e v i e w , n o . 1 3 , 
M a r c h 3 1 , 1 9 8 0 , p p . 1 9 - 2 5 . 
56 . E l l e n R . J u d d w r o t e t h a t M a r x i s m n o t o n l y p r e d i c t s b u t 
s t r i v e s t o w a r d s e n d i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n m e n t a l and m a n u a l 
l a b o u r a s a f u n d a m e n t a l c o m p o n e n t of its c o m m u n i s t p r o g r a m s , see 
" W o r k i n g C l a s s I n t e l l e c t u a l s in C h i n a , " J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y 
A s i a , v o l . 1 4 , n o . 5 , 1 9 8 4 , p p . 1 5 6 - 1 7 0 , e s p e c i a l l y n o t e 2 . 
5 7 . T h i s d o c u m e n t w a s a d o p t e d b y t h e S i x t h P l e n a r y S e s s i o n of 
t h e 1 1 t h C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e C C P in J u n e 1 9 8 1 ; r e p r i n t e d in 
H o n g q i ( R e d Flag)， 1981， no•13， p p . 3 - 2 7 . 
5 8 . R M R B , A p r i l 5 , 1 9 8 2 . " H a t " w e r e a n o t h e r n a m e for t h e 
n e g a t i v e l a b e l s g i v e n t o m e m b e r s of t h e f i v e b a d c l a s s e s d u r i n g the 
C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . 
5 9 . D e n g X i a o p i n g , " t h e P r e s e n t S i t u a t i o n a n d T a s k s " ( J a n u a r y 
1， 1980)， S e l e c t e d W o r k s of D e n g X i a o p i n g ( 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 2 4 6 . 
6 0 . C h e n : Y u n ， “ G u a n - y u Gai-shang Zhong-nian Zhi-shi Fen-zi 
Shen-huo Dai-yu Wen-ti de Yi-jian ( O p i n i o n s on I m p r o v i n g the L i v i n g 
C o n d i t i o n s of M i d d l e - a g e d I n t e l l e c t u a l s )“ (Ju l y 1 , 1982)， Z h i - s h i 
F e n - z i W e n - t i W e n - x i a n X u a n - b i a n (The S e l e c t i n g R e a d i n g s on 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s’ P r o b l e m s ) ( B e i j i n g : R e n - m i n C h u - b a n S h e , 1983 ), 
p . 1 7 5 . 
6 1 . H u ' s s p e e c h o n M a r c h 23， 1 9 8 0 at t h e S e c o n d N a t i o n a l 
C o n g r e s s of t h e C h i n e s e S c i e n t i f i c a n d T e c h n i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 
p r i n t e d in Bei.i ing R e v i e w , no . 15 , A p r i l 1 4， 1 9 8 0 , p p . 1 3 - 1 6 . 
6 2 . D e n g X i a o p i n g , ”Speech at t h e O p e n i n g C e r e m o n y of the 
N a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e on Science，” o p . c i t .’ p . 1 0 9 . 
6 3 . N i e R o n g z h e n , “ F a - h u i Zhi-shi Fen-zi de Zuo-yong shi Wei-le 
Quan-guo Ren-min de Li -yi (To G i v e P l a y to I n t e l l e c t u a l s is 
B e n e f i c i a l to t h e W h o l e c o u n t r y ) " ( A u g u s t 22， 1 9 8 2 ) , G u a n M i n g Ri 
B a o , S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 9 8 2 . 
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64 • S e e a l s o , ‘‘ Zhong-gong Zhong-yang Zu-zhi Bu Guan-yu Luo-shi 
Da郎 de Zhi-shi Fen-zi Zheng-ce de Ji-dian Yi-jian ( S o m e O p i n i o n s 
o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e C C P o n I m p l e m e n t i n g t h e P a r t y ' s 
P o l i c i e s "toward I n t e l l e c t u a l s ) " ( N o v e m b e r 3， 1978)， Z h i - s h i F e n - z i 
W e n - t i W e n - x i a n X u a n - b i a n . p p . 5 1 - 6 4 . 
6 5 . I n f a c t , a l l t h e s e p o i n t s h a v e b e e n f r e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d in 
t h e m a s s m e d i a in t h e 1980s； see f o r e x a m p l e , G u a n M i n g Ri B a o or 
B e i j i n g R e v i e w , J a n u a r y 14， 1 9 8 5 , p p . 6 - 7 a n d J u l y 13， 1 9 8 7 , p p . 8 - 9 . 
6 6 . S e e f o r e x a m p l e , '' Zhong-gong Zhong-yang Zu-zhi Bu Guan-yu 
Luo-shi Dang de Zhi-shi Fen-zi Zheng-ce de Ji-dian Yi-jian,“ 
o p . c i t • , p . 5 9 - 6 1 ； a n d Bei.iing R e v i e w , O c t . 21 1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 3 - 2 5 . 
6 7 . H u ' s s p e e c h o n M a r c h 2 3 , 1 9 8 0 , s u p r a n o t e 6 2 , p . 1 4 . 
6 8 . H u ' s s p e e c h d e l i v e r e d at t h e m e e t i n g in c e l e b r a t i o n of t h e 
6 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e C C P o n J u l y 1， 1 9 8 1 , 
p r i n t e d in H o n g q i , n o . 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 , p p . 2 8 - 3 8 . 
6 9 . R M R B , D e c . 3 0 , 1 9 7 9 . 
7 0 . R M R B , F e b r u a r y 14， 1 9 8 0 . 
7 1 . R M R B , J u n e 13， 1 9 8 1 . 
72.Bei.iing R e v i e w , n o . 3 4 , A u g u s t 2 3， 1 9 8 2 , p p . 6 - 7 . 
7 3 . D o c u m e n t : ” Z h o n g - g o n g Zhong-yang Guan-yu Jian-cha Yi-ci 
Zhi-shi Fen-zi Gong-zuo de Tong-zhi (The N o t i c e of t h e C e n t r a l 
C o m m i t t e e of： t h e C C P a b o u t C h e c k i n g U p on I n t e l l e c t u a l s Work)“ 
( J a n u a r y 3 0， 1 9 8 2 ) , Z h i - s h i F e n - z i Z h e n g - c e Wen-.i ian H u i - b i a n (The 
C o l l e c t i o n of D o c u m e n t s o n I n t e l l e c t u a l s’ P o l i c i e s ) ( H u n a n : H u n a n 
R e n - m i n C h u - b a n S h e , 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 . 
7 4 . D e n g X i a o p i n g W e n - x u a n , o p . c i t . , p p . 1 8 2 - 1 8 5 . 
7 5 . T h e s e a r e a l s o k n o w n as " F o u r A d h e r e n c e s " : to a d h e r e to the 
s o c i a l i s t r o a d of d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , 
t h e C C P ' s l e a d e r s h i p a n d M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t - M a o Z e d o n g T h o u g h t . 
7 6 . Z h o u E n l a i p r o p o s e d in a c o n f e r e n c e in 195 6 t h a t , the 
c o u n t r y s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s as p a r t of w o r k i n g 
c l a s s , a n d v a l u e h i g h l y t h e i r w i l l a n d a b i l i t y to w o r k for the 
c o u n t r y , as w e l l as i m p r o v e t h e l i v i n g and w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . S e e Z h o u E n l a i , Z h o u E n l a i J i a o - y u W e n - x u a n , 
o p . c i t . , p p . 1 0 2 - 1 3 9 . 
7 7 . T h e s c r e e n p l a y , a l s o k n o w n as " B i t t e r L o v e " o r " T h e S u n and 
t h e M a n , " w a s f i r s t l y c r i t i c i z e d in t h e J i e - f a n g R i - B a o on A p r i l 
2 0 , 1 9 8 1 . 
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7 8 . S e e Y u a n F a n g , ”，Ku-lian，yu Zhi-shi Fen-zi de Ai-Guo Xin 
( B i t t e r L o v e a n d I n t e l l e c t u a l s， P a t r i o t i s m ) " , H o n g q i , n o • 9’ 1 9 8 1 , 
p p . 2 7 - 3 3 . 
7 9 , R M R B , D e c . 2 4 , 1 9 8 1 . 
8 0 . F o r e x a m p l e , R M R B , M a r c h 8 ， A p r i l 3 0， S e p t e m b e r 2 3 ， 2 5 , 
O c t o b e r 31， a n d N o v e m b e r 2 , 3 . 
8 1 . D e n g L i q u n , “ Z a i Guo-wu yuan Xue-wei h'ei -yuan hui Xue-ke 
Ping-yi zu Hui-yi shang de Jiang-hua ( S p e e c h o n t h e M e e t i n g o f t h e 
S u b - c o m m i t t e e o n E v a l u a t i n g C o u r s e s of t h e C o m m i t t e e o n D e g r e e s of 
t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l )， " R M R B , S e p t . 2 5， 1 9 8 3 . 
8 2 . D e n g X i a o p i n g‘s s p e e c h o n O c t . 12， 1 9 8 3 . S e e J i a n - c h i Si-
x i a n g J i - b e n Y u a n - z e F a n - d u i Z i - c h a n Jie-.i i Z i - y o u H u a ~ ( A d h e r i ^ 
t h e F o u r C a r d i n a l P r i n c i p l e s a n d A n t i - B o u r g e o i s L i b e r a l i z a t i o n ) 
( B e i j i n g : R e n - M i n C h u - b a n S h e , 1 9 8 7 ) , p p . 2 6 8 - 2 7 6 . 
8 3 . S e e t h e s p e e c h e s of s e v e r a l l e a d e r s , f o r e x a m p l e , D e n g 
Y i n g - c h a o , Z h a o Z i - y a n g a n d H u Y a o - b a n g , s e p a r a t e l y p r i n t e d in 
R M R B , M a y 2 5 , J u n e 2 , 1984； a n d A p r i l 1 4， 1 9 8 5 . ‘ 
8 4 . F o r d e t a i l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e W r i t e r ' s C o n g r e s s , s e e f o r 
e x a m p l e , M e r l e G o l d m a n , " t h e Z i g s a n d Z a g s in t h e T r e a t m e n t of 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s , " T h e C h i n a Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 1 9 4 , D e c . 1 9 8 5 , p p . 7 0 9 -
7 1 5 . 
85.Hu‘s s p e e c h " O n t h e Party‘s J o u r n a l i s m W o r k , " p r i n t e d in 
R M R B， A p r i l 1 4 , 1 9 8 5 . 
8 6 . R M R B : J a n u a r y 1， 1 9 8 7 . 
8 7 . R M R B , J a n u a r y 6 , 1 9 8 7 . 
8 8 . R M R B , J a n u a r y 1 7， 1 9 8 7 . 
8 9 . R M R B , J a n u a r y 19， 20， 25， 1 9 8 7 . F a n g L i z h i w a s t h e v i c e -
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f S c i e n c e a n d T e c h n o l o g y in A u h u i 
P r o v i n c e , w h e r e a s W a n g R u o w a n g w a s a m e m b e r of t h e Writers‘ 
A s s o c i a t i o n , a n d L i u B i n g y e n w a s a v i c e - c h a i r m a n of t h i s 
a s s o c i a t i o n . S o m e o t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l s w e r e a f f e c t e d b u t w e r e n o t 
p u b l i c l y c r i t i c i z e d . 
9 0 . S e e S h e n F a n g , ” J i n - s h u , Jin-hao, Jin-xi Nei-mu ( I n s i d e 
S t o r y o n t h e B a n n i n g of N e w s p a p e r s , B o o k s , a n d M o v i e s ) ,” Z h e n g M i n g 
( H o n g K o n g ) , M a r c h 1987， p p . 1 3 - 1 5 . 
9 1 .工 n d e e d , s o m e f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s w e r e a n x i o u s a b o u t t h i s 
c a m p a i g n； s e e R M R B , A p r i l 2 , 1 9 8 7 . 
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” 9 2 . m m ， J a n u a r y 3 0 ， a n d F e b r u a r y 2 ， 1 9 8 7 . T h e s o - c a l l e d 
d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s " a r e t h o s e s m a l l p a r t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e t h e 
f o u n d i n g o f t h e P R C , a n d h a d c o o p e r a t e d w i t h t h e C C P . T h e y s t i l l 
e x i s t i n t h e P R C in n a m e n o w a d a y s . 
9 3 . R M R B , F e b r u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 8 7 . 
9 4 . R M R B , J u l y 2 2 , 1 9 8 7 . 
. 9 5 . I n f a c t , D e n g X i a o p i n g d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e a n t i - b o u r g e o i s 
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n c a m p a i g n w o u l d l a s t a t l e a s t 20 y e a r s . S e e “ Q i - z h i 
Xian-ming di Fan-dui Zi-chan Jie-Ji Zi-you Hua ( H a v e a C l e a r - C u t 
S t a n d o n A n t i - B o u r g e o i s L i b e r a l i z a t i o n ) ,“ R M R B , D e c e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 . 
9 6 . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , C h e n X i t o n g , ” Zai Zhong-gong Ren-da 
Chang-wei Hui Di-ha Ci Hui-yi de Bao-gao (The R e p o r t o n t h e E i g h t h 
M e e t i n g of t h e S t a n d i n g C o m m i t t e e of t h e N a t i o n a l People，s 
C o n g r e s s )，” H u o Y u X u e Z i Z h e n X i a n g (The R e a l F a c t s of F i r e a n d 
B l o o d ) ( T a i p e i : Z h o n g - g o n g Y e n - j i u Z a - z h i S h e , 1 9 8 9 )， p p . 4 : 2 7 6 -
4 : 2 9 4 . T h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s a l s o b l a m e d t h e e v e n t s o n Z h a o Ziyang‘s 
t o l e r a n c e of t h e s p r e a d i n g of b o u r g e o i s l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . 
9 7 . R M R B , “ D e n g Xiaoping Hui-jian Mei-guo Zong-tong Bu-shi shi 
de Tan-hua ( T a l k of D e n g X i a o p i n g w h e n R e c e i v i n g t h e A m e r i c a n 
P r e s i d e n t B u s h ) ,” F e b r u a r y 2 6 , 1 9 8 9 ; s e e a l s o R M R B , J u n e 26， 1 9 8 7 . 
9 8 . P e t e r N . S . L e e , " D e n g X i a o p i n g a n d t h e 1 9 8 9 T i a n a n m e n 
S q u a r e I n c i d e n t，” in C u l t u r e a n d P o l i t i c s in C h i n a : A n A n a t o m y of 
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A Study Of The Generations Of 
Chinese Intellectuals 
That Is As Old As The Republic 








The Orientation and Values 
of the Generation as Old as the Republic 
A Generation 
The night of darkness has given me dark eyes, 
But I use them to seek for light. 
--Gu Cheng^ 
Gu Cheng's poem represents many of the experiences and ideals of 
his generation. Indeed, to those who grew up with the republic (PRC) 
and shared its fate, the time from childhood to youth and young 
！ j 
adulthood was a nigh七mare. However, at the same time, their experience 
of trials and tributions in their own lives and exposure to 
selfishness, cruelty, and ruthless struggle during the Cultural 
Revolution wakened them, making 七 h e m contemplate China's problems and 
eager to find the truth for themselves and their motherland. 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the orientation 
and values of this generation of Chinese intellectuals who were born in 
the late 1940s and 1950s. This generation is called "the generation as 
old as the Republic’，in the Chinese context, and they are marked by 
distinctive characteristics which are ”derived from common age", as 
I 
Marc Bloch put it. Their attitude toward the Chinese society and 
polity differ from that of older generations. They will assume 
significant roles in all areas of life in the PRC in the foreseeable 
future. 
The members of this "generation as old as the Republic" are 
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widely known as "Mao's children" because they reached their teenage 
years during the Cultural Revolution and they witnessed the 
unprecedented magnitude of political struggles led by Mao Tse-tung (Mao 
Ze-dung) from 1966 to 1976. They are also called "the third generation" 
in the sense that they were the generation born after the first 
revolutionary generation who established the CCP and the second 
generation born during the Anti-Japanese War. 
HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT 
It is by no mean easy to characterize with Western concepts and 
language, the values and orientations of this generation born during 
the founding of the PRC, whose historical experience is indig'eneously 
； 
Chinese. In their own language, Chinese, this generation has often been 
called those who were "born in the New China, and grew up under the Red 
Flag." They were also regarded as the "Flowers of the Motherland" 
because of the privileges and advantages which they exclusively enjoyed 
in contrast to the older generations. They had no experience of war. 
They were nurtured by the whole nation at a time when people were full 
of happiness and pride. Their childhood was depicted as a ”Golden 
C h i l d h o o d , 3 
Regarding their educational experience, they received an ideal 
Communist education. They accepted collectivist values and diminished 
the importance of the individuals. As the famous Communist slogan said, 
"read Chairman Mao's books, listen to Chairman Mao's words, follow 
Chairman Mao's orders, and be good soldiers of Chairman Mao.” This was 
their theme, their standard and their faith. Thus, they had no need to 
pursue anything for themselves. They were not allowed to. Everything 
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had been prepared for them by their elders, the generations that 
fought the revolution. 
The members of this generation were formally educated by their 
schools， families and society. Because this education was based on 
politically orthodox values, they became idealists and nationalists who 
really wanted to make a contribution to their motherland and their 
people. To them, the entire world was good and the future bright. 
Therefore, when Chairman Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966， youths of this generation were sincerely willing to 
sacrifice themselves for the revolution and their beliefs. However, the. 
tragedy of the Cultural Revolution pushed them from an ideologically 
motivated childhood into a painfully disillusioned young adulthood. The 
distance between ideals and reality was frightening. These young 
people felt that they had been cheated. Like Liang Heng, the author of 
the Son of Revolution, a famous memoir of growing up in the turbulence 
of the Cultural Revolution, said, 
Together with thousands of ex-Red Guards like myself, I 
gradually learned that I had been exploited for political 
purposes. I began to ask questions about the fit between 
feudal Chinese culture and Mao，s terrifying version of 
Communism, about why there was such a discrepancy between 
the beautiful worlds described in our books and the harsh 
reality around us.' 
In 1966， the year the Cultural Revolution started, youths born 
around the year of China's liberation in 1949 were teenagers. As they 
were trained to be faithful and innocent, they quickly became involved 
in the Great Cultural Revolution. Many became Red Guards. They 
believed they were Chairman Mao‘s good children and should participate 
in his campaign. Nonetheless, some of them soon found that their 
r ， 
family class origins hampered their involvements." Those belonging to 
bad-class origins were discriminated against and attacked by those 
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children of red class origins. Conflicts emerged among those young 
people. They found that they were not the same. The red class youths 
believed that they were pure children of Mao and so they were even more 
passionate in their involvement in the campaign. 
Yet, conflicts among ordinary people and attacks on the top 
government and party leaders, which included many of the parents of the 
Red Guards, soon changed these youths‘ perceptions of the world. Those 
who had originally belonged to red classes became the bad-class 
children. They were discriminated against by the others, just as they 
themselves had once treated the bad-class people J They were confused 
by the sudden changes. They were also very disappointed that during the 
cruel political struggles, people deceived and told on each other; 
politicians utilized sincerity for their mean purposes; people viewed 
those who were kind and upright as foolish, while villains easily 
succeeded. Because schools were closed for a period to allow students 
to take up the revolution full time, most youngsters could not continue 




China was awash in a sea of chaos at that time. In order to stop 
the chaos, Mao send the youths to rural areas under his "Shang-shan 
Xia-xiang" policy. Nearly an entire generation of urban youths, around 
17 million young people, were sent to rural areas because of the 
• 1 ‘ • policy of rustication. Because of Mao's initiative, many of the urban 
school graduates ( z h i - s h i qing-nian) devoted their lives and knowledge 
to help their village compatriots. They expected to contribute to the 
development of the community which they settled. But in reality, many 
problems diminished the enthusiasm of these youths. 
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Life in rural areas was harsh to young people who had grown up 
in urban areas. Low living standards and the great physical demands of 
agricultural life were only part of the problem. The local cadres and 
peasants also discriminated against themJ Even more disappointing, 
they did not know when or if they would be able to return to the cities 
and their families. When the state announced later that some of the 
sent-down youths' could be admitted to universities with the 
recommendation of village cadres, based on their political conduct and 
works, they saw a beam of hope. Nonetheless, the competition among 
youths for the limited' vacancies also manifested the dark side of the 
society. The right to recommend the youths gave village cadres many 
chances for corruption and taking advantage of the young people. 
As a result, the youths found they had been misled. Society was 
not as good as they had been told. Their future was dark and hopeless, 
their ideals and beliefs dashed. In the rural areas, they had to 
concern themselves with their individual necessities and many became 
selfish. ,They felt they were no longer "the flowers of the motherland" 
I 1 
because they had been neglected by the Chinese leaders in far away 
cities. Wang Anyi, a young writer, expressed, 
The experience of our generation was tragic. Our beliefs in 
the daily lives were destroyed. When we were younger, the 
schools and families told us that we had to ' forget 
ourselves‘(wan wo), and had to contribute to socialism and 
communism.... But when we went to the villages, [we found 
that] it was very important to be concerned about 
'oneself . One had to eat, to sleep, to get all the 
necessities. At that time, the ideals of the youths were 
destroyed and they became selfish. What about 'the Golden 
Adolescence,， what about 'the flowers of the nation?' Ke 
felt that we had been cheated. 
They were confused and frustrated. Some of them began to think 
and question what they learned earlier, so as to find a road for 
themselves and for China. A typical example was Yang Xiguang's "Whither 
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China?," which was written in 1968.'^ 
Yang was regarded as the forerunner of "the thinking generation," 
as another scholar of this generation, Wang Xizhe, observed." In his 
article, he proclaimed that the major conflict in China was not between 
Mao，s supporters and enemies, nor between China's proletariat and the 
former wealthy class, but rather between a "red capitalist class" and 
11 
ordinary Chinese people. He thought and hoped that such a class 
needed to be forcibly overthrown and replaced by a "new society of the 
Paris Commune type," whose officials "will be produced in the struggle 
to overthrow the decaying [ruling] c l a s s . A f t e r all, 
These officials...will have no special privileges. 
Economically, they will receive the same treatment as the 
masses in general. They may be dismissed or replaced at any 
time at the request of the masses. 
As linger commented, Yang's essay "struck a chord among others of 
his generation because he had reached a point in his cognitive 
development that was parallel to their own, and consequently 
articulated thoughts that others were ready to g r a s p . T h e Li Yizhe 
big character poster ( d a zi pao) in 1973-1974 could be viewed as the 
echo of Yang's essay. 
From 1973 to 1974, a small group of young intellectuals in 
Guangzhou wrote and publically posted an essay, "On Socialist Democracy 
^ rj 
and the Legal System.“ This essay was signed by the name Li Yizhe^ 
and quickly circulated widely in China because it reflected a 
breakthrough in the thinking of this generation. 
While criticizing the Lin Biao clique as ultra-leftist, the 
eassy' s most significant message was a cry for the re-establishment of 
the rule of law so as to protect ordinary powerless citizens who wanted 
to participate in the political arena. Moreover, the Li Yi-zhe group 
also asserted that, in order to avoid a recurrence of tragedy of the 
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Lin Biao Incident, it was necessary to allow political opposition.'^ 
These youths were later jailed, but their essay indicated a change 
from blind faith to rational critique. 
Disillusionment 
Later in the Cultural Revolution, those who were born in or 
around 1949 were in their twenties. They were more mature and gradually 
became aware of the problems of China. Yet, they did not openly express 
their grievances until the death of Premier Zhou Enlai caused a big 
demonstration, known as the April Fifth Tienanmen Incident, a sign of 
their awakening. 
The "Gang of Four's" hige-handed approach toward the 
demonstrations of mourning for Premier Zhou En-lai did provoke strong 
reaction at,the mass level, given the respect and popularity which Zhou 
was able to command during his life. A few days before the Qing Ming 
Festival, which began in late March 1976， crowds of people had begun 
placing many wreaths, poems and bunches of flowers on the Revolutionary 
Martyrs' Memorial in the centre of Tienanmen Square. Nonetheless, on 
April 4, the eve of Qing Ming Festival, until the morning of April 5, 
the public security forces forced people to leave the Square. People 
were angrier than before. They brought even more wreaths and poems. 
Their action not only praised and commemorated Premier Zhou, but also 
openly blamed the Gang of Four. That night, the government sent many 
public security officials to clear the square again. Hundreds of 
demonstrators were arrested and some were killed. The crackdown 
continued for a few months afterward until the arrest of the Gang of 
„ 19 
Four. 
Many of the demonstrators were from the "generation as old as the 
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Republic." People could still remember the fanaticism, innocence and 
loyalty of the Red Guards at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. 
This was the same generation whose behaviour changed to its complete 
opposite after ten years later. In the April Fifth Incident, they were 
mournful, solemn, and defiant. The April Fifth Incident came to 
symbolize resistance and regeneration.⑶ 
The end of the "ten years of turmoil," as the Cultural Revolution 
period from 1966 to 1976 is also called, gave this generation 
opportunities to speak out. Their voices reflected their doubt, their 
awakening and their thoughtful meditations on what they once they 
believed was the truth. As an illustration, a young poet, Bei Dao, 
wrote in his poem titled "Reply": 
Let me tell you, world, 
I -- don't -- believe！ 
Even if a thousand challengers are at your feet, 
Count me as the thousand-and-first. 
I don't believe the sky is blue； 
I don't believe in the echo of thunder; 
I don't believe that dreams are false: 
I don't believe in death without retribution. 
When he shouted, "I -- don't -- believe!“, he expressed the thinking 
of his generation, which appropriately came to be known as the 
"doubtful generation.“ 
Some of the youths started to question the political system 
itself. In the winter of 1978-1979， they began to openly express their 
discontent by attaching posters to a wall in the Xidan district of 
Beijing. " These posters called for an end to corruption in government 
23 
and even appealed for Western-style democracy. The party could not 
tolerate such open threats. In December 1979, the state revoked the 
right to put up posters on the Xidan Democracy wall. The offices of 
underground publications and organizations were searched. The main 
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activists ~ Wei Jingsheng, for example — were arrested. 
Many members of this generation, however, did not question 
China，s political system. In 1977, the Entrance Examination of the 
tertiary institutions was restored permitting youth to enter 
universities through examinations once again. The most intellectually 
outstanding members of this generation finally had a chance to get a 
tertiary education. Needless to say, it was a turning point for many of 
them, although for some of those who already had the resposibility of 
families, it was a little bit too late. Under the new open policy of 
the state, they were exposed to the world and its sea of knowledge. The 
older members of this generation who had completed their education in 
the Cultural Revolution were given good jobs and encouraged to pursue 
further studies or training. Hoping not to waste time again, they were 
keen on studying. 
Furthermore, because of the Open Door Policy China's leaders had 
followed, since 1978, there was an influx of Western learning and 
scholars,, and an outflow of Chinese intellectuals to the West. The 
generation that once thought China had a brilliant future now realized 
its backwardness. They became the main supporters of Deng Xiaoping's 
reform policies. 
By the 1980s, the members of the "generation as old as the 
Republic" were in their thirties, like the People's Republic of China 
itself. They became the backbone of many sectors of society. However, 
their past experiences had been engraved in their minds and were 
reflected in their thoughts and behaviour. Compared to older 
generations, their journey from faith and innocence, to doubt and 
despair, and finally to independent thinking is unique. They have been 
portrayed as a "thinking generation,“ because of their need to rethink 
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basic assumptions about China's problems in the post-Mao reform period. 
Their impressions of and contemplations of their past lives are 
reflected in their literary works, which reveal the distinctive 
characteristics of this generation. 
DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
The "generation as old as the Republic" has five main distinctive 
characteristics, which are explained below: 
(1) Nationalism and sense of mission 
Nationalism is the main characteristic of this generation. To 
them, nationalism is not merely an identification with the Chinese and 
their culture, but also a strong faith in the nation, and a desire to 
develop China. In fact, there was not much different between 
nationalism and patriotism from their point of view. 
Once they were radical soldiers fighting for Communist ideals. 
1 
However, after facing the reality of Chinese Communism during the 
Cultural Revolution, their ideals were dashed, and they faced a crisis 
of belief. Nonetheless, their revolutionary fervour still remained, 
although in a a different form. They were still eager to work for the 
prosperity and vigour of the nation. ‘ Yet, their common earnest wish 
was to find the road to modernize China. 
Most members of this generation think that it is their mission to 
modernize China. This belief may have grown because they were born in 
the period of the establishment of the republic, and what they learned 
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of nationalism was engraved into their minds. 
They had been indoctrinated with the importance of the nation and 
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society. Even after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, their sense 
of mission and enthusiasm did not disappear. In the words of a famous 
Red Guard, Bu Dahua, 
The youths of our generation are looking forward to 
constructing a modern, highly civilized and democratic 
socialist country. [We have to] do many things, and a youth 
with high aspirations should contribute his abilities to 
this goal. I，ve changed a lot in the past twenty years. But 
my sense of mission and enthusiasm did not disappear, and 
will never disappear. 
Indeed, "whither China?" is always the main preoccupation of this 
generation. 
Similarly, they are preoccupied with the question of whether the 
nation can be enlightened or not. A study done in 1987 on the values of 
Shanghai young intellectuals (i.e. those 28 to 40 years old) mentioned 
that, 70 per cent of the subjects thought they were most concerned with 
"the economic reform and the political reform of the state". They all 
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were keen on participating in the reform process. 
The celebrated television series "River Elegy" {He Shan), 
produced in 1988, showed clearly that they really wanted to understand 
the nation's problems, and pursue a bright future for China. This six-
part series was mainly written and directed by three young 
intellectuals, Su Xiao-kang, Wang Luxiang and Xia Jun, and advised by 
some young scholars like Jin Guantao. It was a series of anguished 
meditations on China's ancient past and recent history. At the same 
time, it drew a sharp contrast between an archaic, muddled past and 
the Western-influenced present. From that, the authors emphisized the 
necessity for China to move from enclosure to opennesss. This series 
has generated unprecedented passion and controversy among people, in 
particular in intellectual circle, because it manifested their sense of 
28 
national crisis once they became aware of China's backwardness. 
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Shu Ting, a young female poet, wrote a poem which seems to 
summarize the sentiments of this generation. The last part of "Oh 
Motherland, My Dear Home Country" reads, 
I am one of your one billion people, 
Yet the sum of your nine hundred sixty square kilometres, 
With your bruised and scarred breast, 
You have bred the I that is miserable, 
The I that is mediative, and 
The I that is ebullient, 
So do take from my body of flesh and blood; 
for 
Your wealth, your glory, your freedom. 
——Oh motherland, 
‘ ^ q 
My dear home country. 
It is a plea from the heart of this generation. It is the feeling of 
hope mingled with despair. Their crisis consciousness {you-huan yi-
shi) appeared in everything they did. They believe that the future of 
China is closely linked with their own future. Therefore, it is their 
mission to revitalize the motherland. 
Su Wei, who was a scholar in the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, was another example of the patriotism of this generation. In 
the early 1980s, he went to the United States for further study at his 
own expense and, subsequently took a job with the Fairbank East Asian 
Centre at Harvard University. He did not have to go back to China, 
especially since his family suffered serious persecution during the 
Cultural Revolution. As a sent-down youth, he had had to stay on Hainan 
Island for ten years. Nevertheless, Su Wei still decided to return to 
his homeland. He said, 
To me, the motherland is something that I've 
experienced. . . . It cannot be cut out from me. I am a 
worshipper of the land. In the motherland, I can feel a 
sense of cultural belonging. I thought I could do something 
[in China].川 
Su Wei participated in the Beijing Student Movement in 1989 for 
the same nationalistic reason. Although he went into exile in the 
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United States after the June 4 incident, he continued to play an 
important role in the United Front for Democratic China and was still 
eager to help develop China. 
The nationalism of this generation is in many respects no 
different from that of earlier generations of intellectuals. Chinese 
intellectuals traditionally feel responsible for aiding China's 
development. Yet, there is a small difference. The intellectuals of 
"the generation as old as the Republic" pay more attention to the 
relationship between the fate of the nation and themselves. To them, 
"the fate of China equals the fate of Chinese youth. Their support 
for the reform policy is not merely a desire to avoid the history of 
the Cultural Revolution being repeated in China. It is also a desire 
to ensure their own future does not follow the same old disastrous 
road. 
(2)The value of the individual 
Because of their educational background, most members of this 
generation believe in collectivism, but they gradually become concerned 
with the value of the individual. They are now eager to improve their 
skill, to learn more through study. They try to prove their own value. 
3 , 
They are no longer satisfied with being "screws. They argue that, 
if a person has the abilities, why should he or she not become the gear 
wheels J axles, or even the motors? 
When they were much younger, their idols were Communist symbols 
33 
like Lei Feng and Liu Wenxue. They were told in schooldays that it 
was essential to have selfless devotion so as to contribute themselves 
and make others' lives more beautiful. Later, they found that it was 

































































































be ashamed of. Just as Bei Dao said in his poem, "Announcement," 
In the era without heroes, 
I just want 七o be a man. 
Their idols have disappeared. God has become a mortal again. It is the 
time to be concerned with the value of people as individuals. 
However, what is the true value and significance of the 
individual? What is the relation between an individual and the society? 
What are one's obligations and rights? Some of the youths of this 
generation started to raise these questions and try to answer them 
<1 r 
through their writings.'^' 
In 1980, China Youth (Zhong Guo Qing Nian) launched a discussion. 
of "Why Is Life's Road Getting Narrower and Narrower?" It started with 
a letter written by two readers/ two youths of this generation called 
Pan and Xiao. Thus the letter was printed under the pseudonym "Pan 
Xiao." The letter raised the question whether one could really work 
for the sake of humanity. Pan Xiao wrote, 
People are people after all！ No one can escape the laws of 
his own basic n a t u r e . … A l l people are selfish; no one is 
sublime to the point that he forgets himself. All pf that 
past propaganda was just so much pure imagination.'' 
As a result, the authors argued that one should work 
，，subjectively,’ for oneself and do the utmost to develop one's own 
potential. They said the objective result of this enlightened 
individualism would be service to the people. 
I have come to understand this principle: whether one lives 
to exist or to create, everybody works for others by-
working for himself.... Therefore, I feel that, if everyone 
strives to improve the vaJ^ye of his own existence, human 
society must move forward. 
Pan Xiao wanted to use the pen of literature to write about the 
difficulties faced by their contemporaries. However, it was not for the 
purpose of making a contribution to the people or achieving the Four 
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Modernizations. Instead, it was for themselves, for their own personal 
needs. Pan Xiao declared, 
I am. not content to let society treat me as if I were 
nothing. I am determined to use my writing to express my 
existence. 、 
Pan Xiao's letter struck a chord with readers. There were many 
different points of view, but all the youths participating in the 
debate that followed had a desire to share their opinions with others 
of their generation. Pan Xiao's assertion that one should elevate the 
value of the individual received many echoes of support, although some 
were subtle.^^ However, they were not advocating extreme 
individualism. Instead, they thought that caring about individual 
significance was essential for progress. 
In fact, toward the end of the letter, Pan Xiao expressed hope 
that their future writings might influence society. Although they 
claimed that everyone should struggled to achieve his or her own 
desires, Pan Xiao could not envision their own lives without social 
significance. That is one of the characteristics of their 
I 
generation. 
This emphasis on individual value also was evident in the 
enthusiasm for studying that this generation showed in the post-Mao 
era. After 1977，many youths took examinations in order to enter 
universities. Those who were not successful tried to learn more 
through self-study. 
From 1980 to 1986, a total of 1.5 million people earned 
certificates or diplomas from schools of higher-level education for 
adults in China. Their numbers equaled 73 per cent of the total 
graduates from the full-time academies of higher-level education. A 
study of the sent-down youths done in 1989 also found that the 
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educational level of 70.83 per cent youths had improved in the post-Mao 
era. Although their aspiration to study was not always endorsed by 
their work unit or even by society, they did not give up. As many as 
65.28 per cent of the subjects said they planned to strengthen their 
professional knowledge in the next one or two years.“ 
These youths were trying to develop their potential through 
further study. It was a way to prove their value as individuals, and a 
way for self-actualization. They were eager to prove their own social 
significance, no matter how difficult it might be to achieve their 
goals. Indeed, this generation wanted to decide its own destiny. They 
believed that only through proving the value of their individual 
existence could they make a contribution to the state and society. 
(3)The ideal of egalitarianism 
It is no surprise that the Red Guards were idealists. Yet, after 
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had dashed their hopes and 
ideals, it is surprising that the generation remained idealistic. 
Society' s values were set before they were born. They had no 
choice but to accept them. The most important of these was communism. 
Although the Cultural Revolution destroyed the myth of communism, its 
romantic ideals remained in their minds. Even now, the members of this 
generation still dream of an equal society. 
As Jin Guantao, a young scholar, said, "our generation is the 
last of the devoted idealists. To this generation, communism is 
IC 
their ideal. However, to them, a communist society is one in which 
people have equal wealth and equal rights, not the idea of communism 
which the party-state is upholding. In other words, the generation 
seeks what other Chinese want, the "Da-to/jf society traditionally 
77 
advocated by Confucius 
Su Xiaokang, a scholar of this generation who supported the 
students in the Democratic Movement in May and June 1989 and went into 
exile to France later, also stressed that he did not believe at the 
communist system any more, but thought communism as an ideal was good. 
The Chinese, both peasants and intellectuals, had not changed their 
goal of a society of equal wealth.^^ 
Some of the members of this generation with whom I spoke said 
that it was necessary to "let some Chinese to be rich first" under the 
economic reform. However, they have little tolerance for these 
upstarts. In their hearts, they prefered smaller differences in the 
distribution of wealth. Over the past 40 years, China's communist 
system had not proven viable. However, their idea of real communism, 
reflecting the traditional ideal of a ''Da-tonf society, had become 七 h e 
Utopia of a generation disillusioned with the false communism they had 
experienced. 
(4) Understanding "the conditions of China" (guo-qing) 
This characteristic refers to their recognition of the 
backwardness of China. Unlike earlier generations of Chinese 
intellectuals, this generation has an intimate understanding of the 
situation in China's rural area. It is because most of them spent 
several years living with village peasants, i-rho make up 80 per cent of 
China's population. 
After working as peasants, they can understand the poor lives of 
the people of China's lowest stratum. They know the backwardness of the 
rural area. They know the ignorance of the peasants and the 
difficulties of a life struggle against the powers of nature. No matter 
78 
how hard they worked, neither they nor the peasants could grow enough 
food to survive. What were the problems of China? Why did superstitious 
peasants merely try to pray for favourable weather for cultivation, 
peaceful and stable society (feng-tiao yu-shun, guo-tai min-an), and 
good cadres to lead them? They have thought about these questions 
many times. No one could say they were out of touch with ordinary 
Chinese. 
Without being tempered by the hard life of rural China, they 
could never have understand clearly their country's reality. We need 
not worry that this generation will hide itself in an ivory tower. The 
members of no other generation of intellectuals has spent the spring 
time of their lives with ordinary Chinese living on the "yellow earth.“ 
Thus, compared with other generations, they seem much more sympathetic 
with the peasants. They know what the peasants need, and what they 
want. They know how they feel. This is obvious in most of their 
literary works, which show their tenderness and compassion towards 
ig 
China's rural people. 
I 
One of the studies on the sent-down youths mentioned above found 
that 77.78 per cent of the subjects thought the biggest progress they 
had made in the past 20 years was in gaining a correct understanding of 
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society and themselves/ The members of this generation believe they 
have keen insight into the situation in China. Therefore, they have 
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the confidence to work for a better future for China. 
This is precisely what Lin Gu's autobiographical novel, The Red 
Evening (Xue Se Huang Hun), claimed, 
I don，t feel sorry for choosing the road up to the 
mountains and down to the villages ( s h a n g - s h a n xia-xiang). 
Only by going along this road, could I realize the 
difficulties reflected from the wrinkles on the faces of 
the labouring people and understand what they had put into 
their stomach. Also because of that road, I've been trained 
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from a proud student into one who willing to share the 
fate of the people. 
This generation has been shaken by the crying of the peasants. 
(5) The Cultural Revolution Complex 
This generation's obsessive concern with the Cultural Revolution 
is remarkable. Anita Chan's Children of Mao claimed that this 
generation often marvelled with nostalgia at the good old days of "our 
revolutionary p a s s i o n . I t was because the Cultural Revolution 
period was part of their lives and their history. No one could separate 
him of herself from it, even though many of those years were 
sad. Although 七 h o s e convulsive years shook them, forcing them to 
confront the realities of a complex, conflict-ridden p o l i t y , they were 
still reluctant to pull away. Their ambivalence toward the period is 
evident in their written works. Li Xinhua's article is one of the 
echoes: 
Why do I always miss life in the farm? (Whenever someone 
said that my motivation for taking the examination to enter 
the university was to "jump out" from the farm, I was so 
angry. ) Why do ray tears always stop me from using words to 
describe my spring time? I won't deny that people may 
understand such feeling even without having the same 
experience, but it's different from the one who has really 
gone through the life.“ 
Liang Xiaosheng, a writer of this generation, wrote an 
autobiographical story, "On the Piece of Miraculous Land" ( Z a i Zhe-pi an 
Shen-qi de Tu-di Shang) , which also echoed this feeling of 
contradictory emotions. The story described how a group of sent-down 
intellectual youth ( z h i qing) voluntarily spent several years at the 
Big Northern Wasteland (Bei Da Huang) in Heilungjiang province. They 
tried to cultivate the land under poor weather and living conditions. 
Some of them died before they could leave. The others felt they had 
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been used as political pawns. However, like most members of this 
generation, they hate the Cultural Revolution and the scars it lefts 
on their hearts, but are nostalgic for the aspirations and passion they 
felt during that period.^^ 
We have experienced the Bei Da Huang. [Ke have] experienced 
difficulties and happiness while we were cultivating this 
piece of miracle land. Since than, whether [we] le°ft or 
stayed, no agony could make us fear. Nothing could make us 
surrender. 
It was a lesson not easily forgotten. Without the experience of the 
Cultural Revolution, this generation of intellectuals would not have 
been so singular and unique. How could they neglect it? 
The three periods in the history of PRC influenced this 
generation. They passed through "the Red Era’’ of the 1950s, the 
Cultural Revolution, and the reform era of the 1980s. It was this 
background that shaped them and made them unique. 
The practise of viewing themselves as part of a distinct 
generation also make this generation coherent and different from the 
others. Only "the generation as old as the Republic" tried to write 
the stories from the point of view of a whole generation. Only this 
generation usually used "our generation" or "we" instead of "I" in 
their literary works. It is because they know that the same experiences 
and the same thoughts allowed them to understand each other.^^ Guo 
Xiao-Dong says, 
It is because our suffering of excessive distress is a 
collective affliction.... It is the tragedy of our 
generation. Yet, it is also the glory of our generation. 
As they are one of the generation, when they say "we" or "our 
generation", they really mean the thinking of the whole generation. 
That is why Gu Cheng's poem cited at the beginning of this chapter is 
endorsed by all the members of his generation. 
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VALUES AND ROLES 
A particular historical background led to a unique generation of 
intellectuals. What are the political values of these intellectuals 
nowadays? How do they perceive themselves? It is worth studying whether 
they are still carrying the traditional values of the "shi" (scholars) 
stratum. 
One might think that, since this generation was nutured by 
communist ideology, traditional values may have been much less 
influential in their lives. The anti-traditional behaviour of the Red 
Guards during the Cultural Revolution seems to be evidence for such a 
conclusion. Nonetheless, Chinese culture imperceptibly influenced this 
generation since its infancy through their interaction with society and 
families. 
Before the Cultural Revolution, students were indoctrinated 
through many historical stories. Some Confucian ideas, such as being 
loyal to the emperor and patriotic (zhong-jun ai-guo), and sacrificing 
i rc 
oneself to save the country, “ were widely popular. Even Mao himself 
always quoted the old stories in his works. Thus, this generation still 
• A 
identifies with traditional moral standards and values/'"^ Their 
exposure to Western thought in the 1980s did not basically change their 
this fact.卯 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 2， intellectuals were 
discriminated against under the policies of Mao Tse-tung. The status of 
intellectuals was down-graded to the lowest level during the Cultural 
Revolution. Under these conditions, to what extent, do the traditional 
values of " s M " still affect this generation of Chinese intellectuals? 
Two previously mentioned characteristics, namely, nationalism and 
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the dream of a ”Da-tong^，society, are the values traditionally held by 
Chinese intellectuals. In general, three other typical ideals of "sAi" 
also remain in the minds of intellectuals today, although they may 
appear in different forms. 
(i) One must learn till one is knowledgeable enough to become a 
government official {xue er you zhe shi) 
In the early 1980s, most university graduates of this generation 
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wanted to be state cadres. From their point of view, to be a cadre 
is not only the greatest success for a graduate, but is also the best 
way to play a significant role in reforming China. 
Such a perception is compatible with the Confucian doctrine that 
a good scholar will make a government official. It was the main 
achievement of a shi. Besides, the traditional political system also 
encouraged Chinese intellectuals to believe that they could only give 
full play to intellectual knowledge if they became government 
officials. Thus, many intellectuals become bureaucrats. 
I 
(ii) Everything is inferior; only academics are superior 
(wan-ban jie xia-pin, wei-you du-shu gao) 
Although the Communist party-state does not put ranch emphasis on 
education, the public has always assigned it great importance. " Thus, 
the proverb above, when the members of this generation were 
adolescents, they were told to study well in order to make a greater 
contribution to the state. Mao also instructed the students "to study 
well and make improvements every day" ( h a o - h a o xue-xi，tien-tien xiang-
shang) • 
However, the traditional proverb, "Everything is inferior; only 
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academics are superior", also implies that the status of intellectuals 
is superior to that of other groups in society. This idea helped form 
the superiority complex of Chinese intellectuals. It separated the 
intellectuals, consciously or unconsciously, from the peasants and 
workers. This sense of superiority has always been a main feature of 
Chinese intellectuals. 
One might try to point out that the sense of superiority of the 
intellectuals had been destroyed totally in the Cultural Revolution. 
When the youths were sent to the villages, they were told to be 
remoulded by the peasants. In addition, Chairman Mao Tse-tung said 
that intellectuals were the most foolish and ignorant group.^^ How 
could the young intellectuals continue to regard themselves as 
superior? When the youths discovered the backwardness of the rural 
areas, and the extent of China's problems, they often tried to learn 
about these problems through study. Before they came to the rural 
areas, most of them thought that their purpose was to improve the 
situation of rural areas. However, politically, the intellectuals 
suffered from discrimination. Therefore, it is no surprise that the 
members of this generation had contradictory perceptions of themselves. 
Nowadays, the intellectuals' sense of superiority has become more 
obvious. Deng's policies have re-emphasized the importance of 
knowledge and the status of intellectuals has been upgraded. Many-
people assume the income of intellectuals is the second highest in 
China, exceeded only by that of self-employed workers ( z i - y o u zhi-ye 
zhe) In fact, their econmic status is comparatively lower than many 
workers, but intellectuals still regard themselves as superior because 
they possess knowledge. However, this superiority complex has estranged 
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the intellectuals from the workers over the past ten years. 
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(iii) To worry before the whole world starts to worry 
(xian tien-xia zhi you er you) 
This is a traditional value of the ''shi" stratum, indicating the 
sense of social responsibility felt by intellectuals. This generation 
of intellectuals is no exception, as they always concern themselves 
with state affairs. Here, Confucian and Communist values come together. 
Confucius said, "the mission of a shi is be concerned aboutthe national 
affairs" {shi yi tien-xia wei ji ren) and Mao Tse-tung instructed this 
generation that, "you have to be concerned with state affairs" (ni-men 
yao guan-xin guo-jia da-shi). To this generation, concern with the fate 
of the nation is their responsibility.“ Most feel that it is their 
mission to participate in the Chinese establishment. This is 
particularly noticeable among those young intellectuals who advocate 
reforming the establishment from within ( z h e n g - z h i ti-zhi nei gai-ge). 
Such phenomenon also fits with the Confucian stress on 
intellectuals cultivating their own moral character and establishing a 
harmonious and blissful family, then participating in managing state 
affairs to bring peace and stability to the world (xiu-sheng, qi-jia, 
zhi-guo, ping tien-xia). In other words, "to cultivate one‘s moral 
character" in order to prepare to participate in politics, and "bring 
peace and stability to the world" is the aspiration of Chinese 
intellectuals. Therefore, to Chinese intellectuals, knowledge is the 
means, whereas political participation is the end. Their crisis 
consciousness, or deep concern about the fate of their nation, 
determines their role in both traditional and contemporary China. 
Weaknesses and Improvements 
Hence, it is clear that traditional values constrain the role of 
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today，s intellectuals. Facing such constraints, some members of this 
generation have pinpointed these problems in order to make improvements 
and to find a more effective role for themselves in the future. 
Most intellectuals recognize that the main weakness of Chinese 
intellectuals is their attachment-prone personality. They criticize 
Chinese intellectuals for having always attaching themselves to the 
ruling class and being the instrument of the regime. Because Confucian 
political values makes them keen to follow government careers, Chinese 
intellectuals have been political participants and have always held 
hopes of reforming the.political system from within. This results in 
— bureaucratic-intellectual syncretism. Therefore, intellectuals have 
never been an independent power in Chinese history. Whether they were 
used by the regime or not, Chinese intellectuals did not try to decide 
their own destinies. Instead, they usually waited and hoped for good 
leadership (ming-jun) so that they could play important roles and make 
contributions in the polity. They have learned to serve the ruling 
class. 
Both traditional values and China's political system encouraged 
Chinese intellectuals to participate in politics and depend on 
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authority. As a result, their lack of independent personality makes 
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them unable to function like Western intellectuals." 
What is an independent personality? Some intellectuals have said 
it includes at least the following three characteristics: 
a) Conscious efforts to achieve erudition and seek truth as the main 
goals； 
b) Faithfulness to the truth and facts and an unwillingness to vary 
one's standpoint under the pressure of politics or society and; 
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c) Rational attitudes towards nature, society and life. 
86 
Without independent personality, it is meaningless for Chinese 
intellectuals to participate in politics because they cannot act as 
independent critics. 
Even though some of Chinese intellectuals have been aware that 
they should not cooperate with those in political authority,七hey have 
to face the paradoxical conflict between "entering politics" {ru shi) 
and "exiting from politics" (chu shi) In other words, it is the 
dilemma between a sense of involvement and a sense of detachment. On 
one hand, they want to concentrate on research; on the other hand, they 
are still solicitous about China,s problems. Their belief in the need 
to make sacrifices for their country strengthens the political 
sensitivity of intellectuals. Once they participate in politics, they 
give up their research. Therefore, how can they perform their academic 
function and still shoulder their political responsibility? This is 
the perplexing problem of intellectuals today. 
Moreover, they believe that Chinese intellectuals have to rescue 
themselves rather than to wait for someone to improve their situation. 
I I I 
They argue that Chinese intellectuals have a psychological problem 
because of their entangled sense of superiority and inferiority. Many 
intellectuals are self-righteous, but also lack the confidence to save 
themselves. Although they are the main advocates of reform policies, 
their living standards have not improved much. They feel uneasy. 
Nevertheless, most intellectuals continue to place great hope in the 
Chinese leadership to implement those new policies toward 
intellectuals. Where is the hope? However, some of this generation 
instead insist that only when Chinese intellectuals try to find their 
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own weaknesses and overcome them, can they solve their problems！ 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Lucian W. Pye once pointed out that Chinese intellectuals were 
not only powerless in criticizing policies, they also seemed unable to 
engage in the "usual intellectual activity" of pointing up weaknesses 
and flaws in their society and culture. Although some distinguished 
intellectuals excelled at drawing attention to blemishes in Chinese 
character, they were exceptional people among the great majority of 
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inhibited Chinese intellectuals. Pye's insightful remark on Chinese 
intellectuals is true and the traditional values behind the problem 
continue to influence Chinese intellectuals today. Nonetheless, many 
members of "the generation as old as the Republic" have been fully 
aware of these weaknesses and has tried to extricate themselves from 
the predicament of tradition. It is an important step forward for 
Chinese intellectuals. Only when they consciously analyze the essence 
of the problem and criticize the weaknesses in themselves can they 
. 1L 
awaken the nation. • 
The generation of intellectuals as old as the republic consider 
themselves "transitional persons" {guo du ren), whose one foot is still 
stuck in the pool of tradition while the other foot has already stepped 
into m o d e r n i t y . T h a t is to say, they are persons who have been 
influenced by tradition but are willing to accept modern values. They 
understand that, to be "transitional persons" is painful because 
conflicts between contemporary and old values linger in their minds. 
It is this historical environment, projected on this generation, that 
makes them different from both their traditional predecessors and the 
generations of intellectuals ye七七o come. Therefore, sometimes "the 
generation as old as the Republic" find it difficult to be comprehended 
by other generations. Their elders blame them for departing from the 
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classics and rebelling against orthodoxy; the younger generation 
criticizes them because they seem unable to get rid of traditional 
. 76 
influences. However, "the generation as old as the Republic" knows 
that "transitional persons" are evidence of a society moving from 
traditional to modern ways. It is their mission and their role to 
Tf! 
accelerate the process.‘‘ 
Yes, they have braved the worst of China's problems and are 
probing a road to the future. Even if people do not understand their 
feelings and what they have done, they trust their efforts will be 
rewarded by success in.the future. This spirit can be found in many of 
their poems, such as the one below: 
Trust the Future (excerpt) 
I firmly believe in the future 
Because I trust in the eyes of the future people--
Their eyelashes will bat off the dust of history, 
Their pupils will pierce the years of writings. 
No matter what people think about our rotting flesh, 
That sadness of a lost way, that pain of defeat, 
I don't care if they're removed to tears in deep sympathy, 
Or whether they sneer and laugh with contempt. 
I strongly trust people fairly to access 
Our countless explorations, errors, successes, failures, 
To judge our will in a warm-hearted, objective way. 
Yes, I anxiously await their judgement. 
Friend, trust firmly in the future, 
Trust in unyielding effort, 
Trust in the victory of youth over death, 
Trust the future, trust life. 
~ Shi Zhi^^ 
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CHAPTER 4 
Marching Towards the Future 
"The future belongs to our younger generation!" is the common 
plea of the youths in China since 1949. It was especially emphasised at 
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Members of the "generation as 
old as the Republic," although almost middle-aged, still firmly believe 
that they will go forward with their people and their motherland. 
It is not a vague slogan, nor cheap prattle. Some members of this 
generation have tried to explore directions for the future. Jin Guantao 
is a typical example. He says, 
Our generation have gone far down the road of life. It's 
the time for us to think seriously about where we come from 
and where [we] want to go? 
That is ^hy Jin has used his own way of searching for a direction. 
J 1 / 
Besides writting several books and articles, he has been the chief 
editor of a series of books entitled "Towards the Future ( Z o u Xiang Wei 
Lai)'' since the mid-1980s. This series of books was aimed at opening 
the minds of youths, leading them to think and explore different means 
and ways to the future. For the same purpose, Jin also became the 
editor of a journal named Towards The Future. Later, he became a 
leading theorist of the "Toward the Future" school of thought and took 
part in enlightening activities of Chinese culture. 
Jin Guantao is one of the outstanding scholars of the "generation 
as old as the Republic. “ He and Wen Yuankai，another member of this 
generation, Fang Lizhi, and Li Zehou have been called as the "Four Main 
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Thinkers of the youths" by the public.' This is because these 
intellectuals exerted an enormous influence on students through their 
writing, public speaking, and teaching in the 1980s. 
In fact, Jin Guantao and his wife, Liu Qingfeng, have begun 
thinking about the fate and future of China in the early 1970s. Their 
first book on cultural self-reflection, Prosperity and Turmoil — On 
the Ultra-stable Structure of Chinese Feudal Society (Xing-sheng Yu 
Wei-.ii 一一 Lun Zhong-guo Feng-.iian She-hui de Chao-wen-ding Jie-gou) J 
aroused great interest among youths and within the intellectual 
community. This book's basic ideas were generated in 1971， when this 
couple determined that it was their generation's mission to use modern 
scientific methods to investigate Chinese history and understand the 
( 
road the Chinese had followed. In their book, they saw the politically 
unified empire of China producing a pattern of cyclical pattern of 
prosperity to turmoil lasting thousands of years. It seemed that China 
was about to enter the cycle of turmoil once again/ In order to avoid 
yet another period of chaos, they said: 
The Chinese nation should and can re-structure a new 
culture, advance the intelligence of the Chinese nation to 
improve their creative ability, and promote an open, 
scientific, democratic, and rational social structure in 
China so as tp make contributions to the coming twenty-
first century.e 
In the 1980s, Jin and Liu did a great deal of research and wrote 
several books on their findings. They used sociological, historical, 
philosophical and other approaches to examine problems. They are 
exploring new patterns and models. J in and Liu are in most respects 
representative of the "generation as old as the Republic" of Chinese 
intellectuals not just because their works typify the thinking of this 
generation, but also because their participation in enlightening 
1 • 
activities represents the aims of their peers. Futhermore, their 
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publications have evoked resonance among the members of their 
generation. Therefore, a study of their path of rethinking, explorating 
and creating, as well as their perceptions of the roles of 
intellectuals in the reform period of the 1980s, will help us 
understand this generation more clearly. 
Thus, this chapter focuses on describing and interpreting their 
experience and their perceptions of intellectuals, including how they 
evaluate their own generation. It does not intend to be a comprehensive 
study of the thinking of J in and Liu，because it would exceed the scope 
of this paper. Nontheless, by reviewing their ideas on whither China 
and the Chinese, the chapter hopes to identify the perception of a 
viable future for China, which is shared by the Chinese intellectuals 
today. 
THE WAY THEY WERE 
We used our bodies and souls to experience the contemporary 
hi丨story of China. Whether [such experiences] are gratifying 
or painful, we are predestined to accept the great changes 
as our own lives, [and] to think and explore throughout our 
lives. 
- - J i n Guantao and Liu Qingfeng" 
Like all the other members of their generation, they shared the 
fate of New China. Their experiences were no different from those of 
most youths of the "generation as old as the Republic." 
Jin Guantao was born in 1947, in Hangzhou of Zhej iang province, 
while Liu Qingfeng was born at vertually the same time and grown up in 
Chongqing, Wuhan, and Beijing. Their childhood in the 1950s was similar 
to the other members of their generation, a period of happiness under 
the protection of the older generations. "We were called as the 
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'Flowers of the Nation' , and were proud of our red scarfs," Liu 
Qingfeng recalled. Both of them were admitted to Peking University 
before the Cultural Revolution. While Jin majored in Chemistry, Liu 
majored in Physics at first and transferred to Chinese Literature later 
after a period of her sickness. 
Jin and Liu's early interests were in natural science in their 
school days, they were trained to love natural science in order to 
construct socialist China, all the other things having already been 
established by the older generations. However, the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution shattered their beliefs and led them to seek the 
real truth. J in said in his autobiographical article, 
If there had no the Cultural Revolution, or if the Cultural 
Revolution had been postponed by ten years, I would have 
been a scientist, instead of [one] who thinks about 
[Chinese] history, life and philosophy. 
In the summer of 1966, Jin was accused by his classmates of being 
a "white expert" because of his eagerness to study and outstanding 
academic r e s u l t s H e was then excluded from classes. As he watched 
the movement grow, he tried to figure out its causes. 
1 
”L never wrote a big character poster during the Cultural 
Revolution,“ Jin said?“ Unlike many members of his generation, his 
participation in the movement was more independent and rational, even 
though he and his family suffered. Jin ruminated about and questioned 
all the political doctrines and regulations that he had been told 
about. 
"At that time I was 19 years old. Our belief in the Mao Zedong 
Thought had been destroyed • … B u t I hadn，t yet doubted upon Marxism. 
13 
Thus, I spent half a year studying Marxism," Jin recalled. He also 
studied the ideas of Hegel in order to understand China,s contemporary 
problems. Jin still wanted to be a scientist, but he thought that 
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science and philosophy should be consistent with one another. However, 
he soon found that Marxist philosophy was very different from 
scientific thinking. Which was right? He did not know. Nonetheless, he 
engaged himself in finishing experiments, learning foreign languages, 
and studying physics and mathematics. 
"My study was not for examination, but for seeking the truth, ” 
Jin said. As he was good at painting, he got the chance to take 
refuge in an art troupe at Peking University.丨^ This comparatively 
liberal environment gave Jin more spare time to study and to discuss 
philosophy and the Cultural Revolution with his friends, an unusual 
1 fi 
freedom for Beijing in that period. 
After his graduation from Peking University in 1970， the 
government sent J in Guantao to a factory in the countryside near 
Hangzhou. Facing the irrationality of the Cultural Revolution, Jin 
strengthened his belief that only scientifically rational thought could 
17 
help people understand history and find the truth. To summarize the 
changes in his thinking, he began recording his reflections on 
philosophy and society in a notebook. This notebook was then circulated 
amongst his friends and consequently led Jin to meet Liu Qingfeng, whom 
later became his wife. 
Having the same aspiration to pursue the truth，and after a long 
period of soul searching, Liu began to correspond with Jin. The letters 
they wrote to each other between 1970 and 1972 later became the basis 
of Liu's novel, Open Love Letters (Gong-kai de Q i n g - s h u ) T h i s story 
attracted the attention of many young people when it was first 
circulated by hand in the early 1970s and later officially published. 
It appealed to Chinese youths because it showed young intellectuals' 
"iconoclastic rebellion against social convention, active struggle for 
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personal freedom and happiness, and confessional writing as a form of 
19 
self-vindication." Most important of all, the passion and courage 
of its protagonists as they searched for truth and love touched the 
lives of countless Chinese youths.⑶ 
In fact, this story manifested the development of this couple's 
personalities and values. The melancholy caused by the chaos in society 
did not lead them to nihilistic despair, resignation or cynicism. 
Instead they remained devoted to the virtues of truth, goodness and 
beauty. They had a sense of mission that they should devote themselves 
to building a strong China. In this autobiographical story, Liu wrote, 
We work hard because we believe that our motherland should 
be strong and rich, our nation should make progress [in 
civilization]. Our mission is to kick away all the 
obstacles to the proc^ps and lead our nation to follow the 
steps of development. 
Severl things that Jin and Liu said during an interview with the 
present author indicated they still have the same beliefs. 
Jin's faith that only science could save the nation was also 
22 
evident the story. Although his interest changed from pure science 
to social science later on, he always believes that the spirit of 
scientific rationality is important in reconstructing Chinese culture. 
After their marriage in the early 1970s, J in and Liu were 
transferred to Henan province. They worked as teachers in the Zhengzhou 
University. Although Jin still worked as a scientist and continued 
doing experiments, he gradually developed an interest in Social 
Science. His training in science and study of Philosophy led him to 
analyze society in a non-Marxist way. With the benefit of Liu's studies 
of Chinese culture and history, they collaborated in investigating why 
23 
the Chinese feudal system had lasted so long. This question had 
lingering in their mind for a long time. At this stage, their life aim 
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to find universal truths was overcome by their eagerness to "seek the 
r / 
truth of the Chinese•”“ Some of their reflections on Chinese history 
later became the main theme of their book, Prosperity and Turmoil. 
Besides, during the last few years of the Cultural Revolution, they 
also tried to analyze Chinese society and culture. Life in Zhengzhou 
was comparatively peaceful, although still hard. Thus, they were able 
to discuss the fate of China with their contemporaries. 
In 1976, feeling that a big event was about to happen in China, 
Jin and Liu wrote a long poem recording the scars that they had 
experienced in their springtime, and the everlasting ideals in their 
hearts. Liu recalled their feelings: 
The late period of the Cultural Revolution, after the Lin 
Biao Incident, was the most depressing time. [We] actually 
couldn't see a beam of hope. Whether China would change or 
not, no one knew, but we had struggled for several years. 
At that time, people might continue to be despondent. 
However, we tried to encourage ourselves. Even though you 
could not see any hoy^e, you still had to struggle [and] 
pursue [your ideals]. 
Therefore, although their poem, entitled "The Legend of Sun Island 
(Tai-yang Dac de Chuan-shuo) , “ was not particularly influential when it 
was published in the 1980s, Jin and Liu regarded it as a memoir and 
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more important than their other literary publications. 
The dawn of the long-awaited new era came in 1978. J in and Liu 
were transferred to Beijing to be editors in the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. In time, they concentrated on doing research. They developed 
their previous studies. Jin's attention even turned back to 
philosophy. They also got involved in editing the series of books, 
"Towards the Future," which introduce new theories of Western science 
and society and interpreted the historical position of the Chinese from 
21 
the earliest development of human civilization. ‘ Nonetheless, all of 
their work focused on the same theme: 103 
We are seeking the future of China [by] finding the causes 
of setbacks and agony of the Chinese. The development jqi 
our thinking is linked with the contemplation in China. ^ ^ 
Liu，s words express the passion and persistence of the intellectual 
couples‘ experience: 
We always pursue the fate of one generation [and] a way out 
for [our] generation. In fact, [we argj searching for an 
avenue for the nation and the society产 
PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATION OF THEIR GENERATION 
Our generation was grown up in the storm of the Cultural 
Revolution. We and many other members had sincerely become 
involved in the Cultural Revolution to seek our ideals. 
However州 [we] experienced pain when our hopes were 
dashed/L 
Like many members of the "generation as old as the Republic"，Jin 
and Liu frequently mention "our generation" and regard themselves as 
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part of this larger group. How do they perceive their generation? 
Jin and Liu said their generation is "peculiar" because it has 
experienced a traumatic loss of ideological illusions and been forced 
to lead -very difficult lives. Liu said, 
It was actually a weaning [period] for our souls. We could 
not depend on our parents, but had to depend totally on 
ourselves. Such spiritual pains -- no one could be relied 
upon and we know nothing about what was goj^g on -- made us 
have to stand up by ourselves completely. 
However, this experience of hesitation and confusion did not break this 
generation down. Instead, they become even more staunch in their 
beliefs than either the older or the younger generations. In addition, 
Jin and Liu said that their generation's personality has three more 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s： they can more easily communicate with others of the 
same generation because they share the same fate; they are creative in 
the sense that they have been forced to learn everything by themselves; 
and, they are nationalistic. This intensive nationalism is the most 
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distinctive characteristic of this generation. Liu observed, 
"Nationalism is the first and main feature of the generation of Red 
Guards/'""' 
In Jin and Liii，s viewpoint, nationalism is the sentiment which 
r ji 
directs them to seek modernization for C h i n a , It is an idealism which 
come from their training to fight for world communism. When this 
generation found that they were ubable to save the proletariat of the 
world, and that China was backward compared to many countries, their 
passion to save the world was redirected at vitalizing the nation.” 
Furthermore, this generation has surmounted the constraint of 
ideology. They have discarded ideology in process of rethinking the 
Cultural Revolution. Therefore, they are more rational, pragmatic than 
and not so easy to waver their standpoints as other generations of 
intellectuals. They have realized that China should be modernized as 
soon as possible. The best system is one benefites the development of 
China the most. Any ideological controversy is meaningless in the face 
0 rv 
of this larger question. ^ "China has suffered too much [from the 
constraint of ideology],“ said Liu Qingfeng/ 
Given these sentiments, what is the role of their generation of 
Chinese intellectuals in the reform period? J in Guantao and Liu Qing-
feng said they believe that their generation is playing a transitional 
no 
but significant role. In other words, because of their unique 
experience and thinking, they have inherited a different approach to 
China's history and therefore will be more able to go beyond tradition 
in the future. This role cannot be filled by the older or the younger 
. 39 
generations. 
Owing to such characteristics and the current age of this 
generation, Jin and Liu said they expect that their generation will 
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become even more important. Because they have participated in and 
pushed forward the reform process, they understand clearly China's 
position and role in the world. They said they hope that their 
generation will bring pluralistic culture to China in the near future, 
which they argue is indispensable for modernization.^^ 
They also realized the limitations of their generation, in 
particular regarding their lacking of professional training/^ At the 
same time, they are willing to work hard. "We would walk as far as 
• “ • 丨 2 
possible, “ Jin and Liu said. The same dedication is evident with 
other members of the "generation as old as the Republic.“ 
ON INTELLECTUALS 
A great period is coming. An independent stratum of 
intellectuals is going to form in China. It will become a 
main force in the historical stage of the new era in 
pushing forward China's modernization [and] 
L彳 
democratization.... 
This is Jin Guantao and Liu Qing-feng's expectation. 
Nevertheless, they also commented on the personality weaknesses of 
Chinese intellectuals. 
Liu Qing-feng has pointed out that traditional Chinese 
intellectuals were quite different from those of contemporary China. 
Mainly because of the regime's ideological remoulding policies since 
the 1950s, China's intellectuals gradually lost their "moral 
c o u r a g e " T h u s , they came to lack independent personality. In other 
wards, traditional culture is no七 the sole cause of intellectuals' lack 
of independence. Instead, "new traditional values," those values 
developed under the CCP，s ideological remoulding movement, made most of 
45 
the intellectuals lose their ability to insist on their principles. 
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It is a kind of moral courage that this group has lost. By moral 
courage, Liu means the courage of people to pursue and safeguard their 
principles and make use of those principles to judge and counter 
pressures from political, social or cultural authorities. In addition, 
it is the firmness of one's belief when he or she confronts conflicts 
IC 
between ideals and reality. Traditionally, this courage was based on 
the Confucian morals, which emphasized the intellectual's conscience, 
and knowledge and society's ethics. 
However, the moral courage of China's intellectuals gradually 
disappeared under the pressure of the CCP's ideological remoulding 
campaigns. Firstly, the CCP claimed that because most of the 
intellectuals were trained by the bourgeois class and imperialists, and 
they had served the capitalists and imperialists. Therefore, Chinese 
intellectuals had to be remoulded in order to change their bourgeois 
values. Secondly, intellectuals had to agree that their knowledge 
belonged to that of the bourgeoisie. In other words, although the 
intellectuals possessed knowledge, this knowledge did not benefit the 
I 
proletariat. Thus, their claim to superiority based on their possession 
of knowledge disappeared. Besides, since one's class was determined by 
his or her economic status, most of Chinese intellectuals were 
considered bourgeois. As a result, many of China's intellectuals 
voluntarily received the ideological remoulding because they felt 
guilty. They also believed it was their only way of becoming part of 
proletariat. Under these circumstances, China's intellectuals lost 
their moral courage and their ability to think independently. They had 
to depend on Communist doctrine as the only sources of values. Whatever 
the party said, China's intellectuals consciously or unconsciously 
accepted it. Therefore, it was not merely that political pressures 
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influenced the personality of intellectuals, but also because the CCP 
changed the values of intellectuals to the point that they came to 
question their traditional assumptions.^® 
After the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals started to become 
aware of what had happened to them. They attempt to use different 
values as their source of moral courage. Some have tried to return to 
traditional culture, some have inclined toward liberalism, and some 
have even returned to Marxist humanism as a means of advocating the 
value of the individual. However, Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng 
suggest that intellectuals must now base their values on scientific 
rationality if they are to develop critical skills and independent 
personality 
What should the role of intellectuals be in China today? J in 
Guantao has said that this question does not yet have a satisfactory 
a n s w e r . Y e t , China's intellectuals should make clear their dual 
functions. When they are doing research, they are only scholars. If 
they want to be "intellectuals", they should be critical and push 
J 
society forward. Jin and Liu noted that it is very important for 
China's intellectuals to define their functions in a modern society. 
There is no dilemma between studying and political participation if 
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intellectuals understand clearly their roles. 
Moreover, in the view of Jin and Liu, a sense of mission is still 
essential to intellectuals participation in social affairs. Many 
members of the next generation think that such a sense of mission would 
prevent China's intellectuals from developing their creativity and 
talent.53 Nonetheless, Jin and Liu argued that a sense of idealism is 
needed to push intellectuals to pursue higher goals and transcend 
themselves. They said this barkens back to the traditional Chinese 
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value that one should make unceasing efforts to improve oneself (zi-
qiang bu-xi) 
Therefore, J in and Liu have taken the position that this sense of 
mission would motivate intellectuals to create a new culture for the 
modernization of China. China's intellectuals should revive their moral 
courage based on knowledge and scientific spirit, making use of their 
sense of mission to overcome the constraint of traditional culture and 
expedite the reform process.^^ 
ON CHINA'S FUTURE: MODERNIZATION 
Jin and Liu practise what they preach. They have spent years 
studying and contemplating directions for China's future. Defining 
modernity has been one of their key concerns, as modernization has 
always been the main goal of the Chinese. Here, Jin Guantao borrowed 
Weberian thinking that modernity is a progressive demystification of 
humanity and humanity's ideas about the surrounding environment. In 
i I 
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Jin's words, modernity is the situation that exists when a society has 
been liberated from the incantations of tradition. Weber also 
emphasized that scientific technology functions as "instrumental 
r |> 
rationalism" in a modern society. Thus, Jin has argued that the main 
difference between a modern and a traditional society is the influence 
of modern scientific technology on the nature of this society. Not only 
have modern science and technology affected daily human life, but also 
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the spirit of science has had an impact on values and culture. 
Jin stated the three criteria of a modern society. The first 
criterion is the "depersonalization of social roles" ( s h e - h u i jue-se de 
fei-ge-ren-hua). In a traditional society, a person usually had only 
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one role. Everything he did was a reflection of this specific role. 
Consequently, one's value and social relations were linked with this 
role. However, in a modern society, a role is merely defined by its 
function. An individual can have several roles and one's personal life 
and values are not necessary linked to these roles. That is the 
specialization of a modern society. In short, the transformation of a 
traditional society to modern one is the process whereby individuals 
can get abandon a life defined by one single role and instead have 
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freedom to choose among different roles. The change is liberating 
because any person can be trained to take a specific role; it is also 
equalizing bacause anyone can fulfill a specific role as long as he or 
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she can perform its corresponding function. 
The second criterion is the scientific rationalism of people. 
This spirit is characterized by doubt, criticism, testing and 
creativity, which together act as a self-correcting mechanism for the 
culture. Such a mechanism encourages people to criticize old theories 
and accept new findings. It consequently advances a s o c i e t y， 
I I 
Finally, a modern society should be an open society; each citizen 
should have human rights, including freedom of speech. The society 
should not constrict people's thinking. Jin stated that an open society 
is more rational because its political system has a built-in self-
correcting mechanism. This makes it possible for the rulers to change 
according to people's rational will, and reduces mistakes to a minimum. 
6 1 
It is the ideal of democracy. 
How can China be modernized? Jin has replied that the Chinese 
have to overcome the limitations of traditional culture. Jin and Liu 
advocate "disintegration and reconstruction" {jie-gou he chong-jian) of 
the culture. Jin pointed out that China's "moral politics" (dao-de 
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zheng-shi) must first disintegrate. The root of this problem is what 
the calls Chinese culture's pan-moralism ( f a n dao-de zhu-yi). 
Traditionally, Chinese have solved problems by making moral judgements. 
Thus, moral standards became laws or rules which ultimately constrained 
people's thinking. It even suppressed thinking about morality itself. 
In order to avoid such problems, society should make clear that 
morality should only limit behaviour, not thinking. Only when people 
can think freely can they become critical and allow a new culture to 
take shape. Similarly, morality should not be adopted as a political 
standard. Otherwise, morality becomes an ideological constraint and 
everything is defined as a moral question, a phenomenon evident in 
China after 1949. It was this link that forced China's intellectuals to 
pass through a series of ideological remoulding movements in order to 
be moral, i.e. "red". The consequences not merely restricted the 
development of China, but also resticted the development of "rule of 
law" in Chinese society. Instead, the ideal of rule by moral example 
and instruction remained the primary criterion of a good government. 
I 
In addition to the problem of pan-moralism, the "object 
rationalism" (zhi-guan li-xing jing-shen) of Confucian culture also 
limited Chinese modernization. Object rationalism is based on the idea 
that people learn by perceiving their environment directly through 
their senses. This object rationalism grew out of the rational 
structure of Confucianism, which was based on common sense, Confucian 
classics, and morality. As a result，七he thinking of most Chinese 
philosophers can not exceed the boundaries set by these bases. Jin 
comments that object rationalism has two weaknesses. First, it limits 
the pursuit of the truth to what they can determine by using common 
sense, rather than scientific enquiry. Second, it works to maintain the 
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status quo because the Chinese emphasis on the "doctrine of the mean," 
the idea that nothing should stray from the middle way, reinforces an 
unchanging traditional society. Thus, these two limitations formed 
. . . c c, 
invisible obstacles to the progress of Chinese society. ‘ Until today, 
object rationalism still influences many Chinese, including 
A fo 
intellectuals, in examining social rules and culture. ^  
However, J in and Liu have warned that the action of cultural 
disintegration without reconstruction would cause disorder to the 
society. Although reconstruction is a complicated process, Jin Guantao 
and Liu Qingfeng repeat that it is necessary and must be based on 
scientific rationalism. The main task is to find "order" in chaotic 
trends of thought and make use of scientific rationalism in creating a 
pn 
new, pluralistic culture for China. Moreover, Jin and Liu stress that 
they do not advocate "breaking everything down and then building up 
from nothing," but reconstructing Chinese culture by injecting a new 
element, i.e. scientific rationalism. Therefore, they are not 
advocating "wholesale Westernization." They also emphasize that 
although China started modernization later than the West, it should not 
repeat errors made by the West as it modernized. J in and Liu reiterated 
the improtance of science, which they said will allow China to avoid 
repeating these mistakes.^^ What is the essence of science? In the 
words of Jin, 
I believe science is a spirit, which includes the courage 
to explore the t r u计， a n d the doubt required to examine 
things objectively. 
This is their answer to the problems of China. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng are two typical members of the 
"thinking generation" who have devoted themselves to finding solutions 
to China's problem. They are sincere, idealistic and thoughtful. They 
suffered shocks and setbacks because of the Cultural Revolution, but 
they did not lose their sense of mission. They remained calm and 
confronted their economic and political difficulties with a level head. 
Jin and Liu have felt a strong sense of the direction that they should 
go and they have awakened to the folly of Chinese tradition. Their 
story reflects the intense search for new life ideals among the 
"generation as old as the Republic.“ 
Like most members of their generation, when they look back to 
their past experiences, they have no regrets. J in said that even if 
they had life to live over again, they would choose the same road 
11 
because all their choices had been made with the greatest of care. 
Time is passing, but Jin and Liu have not given up their sense of 
mission in seeking a bright future for their nation. They realize it 
is not an easy goal. Yet, they have confidence. As they put it, 
Looking forward to the future, we will still be too young 
to handle the rational, fearless and critical spirit [that 
will prevail] . We are not mature enough and not used to 
using such fierce critiques to express our benevolence and 
love [towards China]. We also lack the talent to change 
doubts to creative power. However, it does not matter. W^ 
are learning because our love [for China] is so deep.…‘ 
The past years of China's tumultuous history have forced the 
"generation as old as the Republic" to rethink the history and future 
of their country and to care about the fate of China. The most 
remarkable thing about this generation is that, despite their painful 
and traumatic lives, they remain committed to the service of their 
country. They look to the future, to reform and change with hope. There 
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are many other members of this generation similar to Jin Guantao and 
Liu Qingfeng, immersing themselves in hard work in order to advance 
China's cultural, political and economic life. Their efforts are the 
true source of China's reform. 
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Conclusion: 





CONVERGENCE OF THE TWAIN 
This paper has studied the Chinese party-state's perception of 
the role of intellectuals, and the self-perception of the generation of 
Chinese intellectuals- that is the same age as the Republic regarding 
its role in socialist China. The previous chapters have demonstrated 
that there is no doubt of the necessity of intellectuals participating 
in China's reform. Exactly what ways they should participate is the 
main problem. The party-state expects intellectuals to make 
contributions to China in economic, scientific and industrial arenas 
under the guidance of the party. However, most of the younger 
intellectuals think that they have a larger role to play. They believe 
intellectuals should spearhead the drive for China's modernization. 
They recognize that reform must not merely happen in economic, 
scientific and industrial realms, but also in political and, above all, 
cultural areas. 1 Their sense of mission makes intellectuals eager to 
participate in all aspects of Chinese society in order to bring quick 
advances to China. They see^hemselves as patriots, but their sincere 
wish for reform challenges the foundations of party control, 
engendering profound political conflicts. 
In 七 he eyes of the leadership of the party-state, the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s are the vacillating elements. Since the great push to 
achieve the Four Modernization began in the post-Mao era, the party-
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state has generally tried to carry out moderate policies in the hope of 
co-opting intellectuals' expertise to pull the country out of its 
economic quagmire, and perhaps strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. 
Nonetheless, the Deng leadership has remained firm in its dedication to 
the Four Cardinal Principles, which regards the CCP's monoply of 
political power as an overriding concern. Unless the intellectuals are 
willing to be controlled by the party, there is no room for them to 
enjoy autonomy even if it were the best way to achieve the Four 
Modernizations. In fact, the party has never given them a free hand in 
their work. Its policy- has repeatedly swung from outright repression of 
intellectuals to reconciliation with them, and back again. The 
intention of the party-state is obvious. Above all else, it is 
concerned with maintaining political order. Fundamentally, it holds 
that intellectuals are appendages of the state. 
For a long time, China's intellectuals were inadequately equipped 
to counter these political restrictions. This was not merely because of 
the CCP's high-handed policies towards intellectuals, but also because 
1 
of the weaknesses of the intellectuals themselves that led them to 
yield their principles to political or social pressure. Nowadays, 
younger intellectuals have woken up to the past catastrophe. They have 
tried to change the situation. 
The intellectuals， awareness 
In the wake of the reforms of the 1980s, many intellectuals, and 
especially the "generation as old as the Republic," have become aware 
of their need for political independence and efficacy. They have begun 
to aspire to professional autonomy and to define intellectual integrity 
as the willingness to defend this autonomy above all. They believe that 
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intellectuals should be independent from the state and dependent on 
non-official sources for their intellectual, moral, and even economic 
support. 
In fact, the open-door policy has given China's intellectuals the 
opportunity to gain more autonomy. Some of they have earned academic 
rpputation and economic support from abroad because of increasing 
chances for Chinese academics to study abroad, to participate in 
international conferences, to publish in international journals, and to 
compete for financial support from internationally oriented 
foundations. In addition, the pressures of economic reform have pushed 
the party-state to encourage Chinese scholars and research units to be 
entrepreneurial and seek financial support from non-governmental 
sources. Thus, the party's control of intellectuals by political means 
has weakened somewhat. Under such circumstances, some intellectuals 
have begun to develop intellectual business ventures as the bases for 
establishing independent intellectual organizations. 
A quite famous case was the ” Du-le Shu-wu' (Capital Joy 
Bookshop), which was opened by a young lady, Yu Yansha, with private 
funds in 1984. It was the first private bookstore in Beijing which 
could publish books and journals. Although its size was comparatively 
small, its basement cafe soon became the meeting place of reformist 
intellectuals. This group of leading intellectuals later gathered to 
promote a privately funded, independent new journal, the N ^ 
Enlightenment (Xin Qimeng). On January 28, 1989，they held a conference 
at the bookshop to promote this journal. However, after publishing only 
two issues, the political authorities forced the bookshops to close 




Another enterprising journal was published on Hainan Island, the 
Special Economic Zone. A group of young writers from Hunan province 
also planned to publish a popular magazine, aiming at making enough 
money to establish a publishing house for serious books. They succeed 
at first, but their journal was also suspend after the Tiananman 
Incident of 1989.' 
A more well-known case to the world is that of Wang Juntao and 
Chen Ziming before the June Fourth Incident. Both members of the 
"generation as old as the Republic" of Chinese intellectuals, they ran 
a privately-owned Beijing Social-Economic Research Institute using the 
talents of intellectuals to make money and later develop an independent 
organization for intellectuals. In fact, they had published Economic 
Studies Weekly to spread new ideas. Unfortunately, Wang and Chen were 
labelled by the party-state as two of the "black hands" behind the 1989 
student movement because of their supporting activities during the 
protests. They are currently serving a 13-year prison sentence on 
charges of sedition and counter-revolutionary propaganda and 
: ( 
incitement. 
One of the most remarkable examples of attempts by China's 
intellectuals to gain true autonomy is related to the Stone Company 
{Si-tong Gong-si) , which is China's most successful computer 
enterprise. It was founded by Wan Runnan, who had been an engineer at 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences before he started this private 
business. Wan, a member of the "generation as old as the Republic," 
cooperated with several young technicians and engineers to establish 
the company in 1984 to improve and produce computers. The company soon 
developed into one of China's main private enterprises.^ What have been 
most impressive to the West are its outstanding profits and market-
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oriented management and administration, as well as its support for the 
student protests in 1989. Wan Runnan himself became a leading exiled 
dissident after the massacre, but the Stone Company still works as 
usual. 
On the other hand, an independent intellectuals‘ group seems to 
have emerged in China. In February 1989, 33 intellectuals sent a 
petition to the CCP and National People's Congress Standing Committee 
urging a general amnesty for all political prisoners, but particulary 
Wei Jingsheng, to mark this year's 40th anniversary of Communist China. 
The action supported an open letter drafted by astrophysicist Professor 
Fang Lizhi in January 1989 asking for the release of Wei Jingsheng. 
Around one-third of this group of intellectuals were members of the 
"generation as old as the Republic,” with the initiative coming from 
Bei Dao. Some of them, such as Jin Guantao, Liu Qingfeng and Su 
Xiaokang, have also been mentioned in this paper. The other signatures 
belonged to older generations and were those of well-known scholars. 
This activity resonated in the intellectuals circles and two group of 
signatures followed before long, one from 42 leading scientists and the 
other consisting 43 names of young and middle-aged journalists and 
scholars in China. They all appealed for special amnesty to the 
dissidents who were still in prison, and actually sought for a larger 
sphere of freedom for intellectual works. Although they failed to free 
any prisoners, their bold actions that infringing upon the party's 
exclusive policy-making domain became a milestone in the awakening of 
China's intellectuals. They had recognized and taken on the major role 
of real intellectuals because they had consciously, co-operatively and 
aggressively spoken out, and put pressure on the party-state. It may 
well be the first time in PRC history that intellectuals have been such 
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a critical organized group of critics. 
On Cultural Reform 
Attempts to change the inert components of the Chinese national 
character have also been a main goal of the younger intellectuals in 
post-Mao China. It has been a hot topic since the mid-1980s, 
particularly, according to many intellectuals, the fundamental problem 
a 
of culture. More and more people became concerned about this question 
when the The World Economic Herold (Shi-.iie Jing-.i i Dao-bao) of 
Shanghai made the statement in early 1988 that China could face a 
crisis because it would "be expelled from the Globe" ( k a i - c h u qiu-ji) 
if China remained backward. Many scholars and students discussed what 
they believed to be a basic crisis in Chinese culture. But the most 
significant statement came in the television series "River Elegy" {He 
Shang) which was shown twice on China's television in the summer of 
1988 before being banned by the government. 
The programs' captions and video images manifest a message: ； 
Chinese civilization, symbolized by the Yellow River, has been 
declining. The Yellow River, once the cradle of Chinese civilization 
has become China's Sorrow because of its periodic floods and changes in 
course due in part to the masses of silt the river carries. One of the 
creators of "River Elegy," Su Xiaokang, pointed out that there have 
been similarities between the disasters caused by flooding of the 
C 
Yellow River and catastrophes in Chinese history. Therefore, there is 
no hope of building on China's past because it has accumulated a 
similar mass of "feudal” sediment that blocks progress towards 
modernization. In order to overcome the hindrance, the authors proclaim 
a need for China to embrace the culture of Western-oriented global 
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civilization, which they symbolize by the "azure" ocean. Near the end 
of the last episode of the series, the camera slowly passes across a 
winding stretch of muddy yellow water flowing into the vast waves of 
the deep blue Pacific Ocean and the narrator comments: 
The characteristics of despotism are secrecy, autocracy and 
arbitrariness. 
The characteristics of democracy should be transparency, 
popular will and scientism. 
We are moving from turgidity to transparency. 
We have already moved from enclosure to openness. 
The Yellow River is fated to cross to loess plateau. 
The Yellow River will merge into the azure ocean. 
The Yellow River should avoid its fear of the ocean. 
The Yellow River has to maintain its indomitable will and 
dynamics from the plateau. 
Life water ^omes from the ocean [and] returns to the 
ocean. 
The concluding metaphor argues that there is no alternative for China's 
modernization but to accept the West's undifferentiated "azure" cul-
ture. The Chinese should not be afraid of the challenges from the West. 
Their message, after all, aims to project a brighter future for 
China. Even though the argument of River Elegy may be oversimplified, 
it evoked a lot of responses across China. Many other young 
intellectuals also came forward with their vision for China. Besides 
Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, who have been introduced in Chapter Four, 
the scientist Wen Yuankai wrote a widely read book, R e f o r m _ _ ^ 
Remoulding of China,s National Character (Zhong-guo Guo-min-xin^ Gai-
zao). In this book, he advocates a pluralistic culture for China in the 
spirit of science, combining the essence of both Eastern and Western 
culture.U 
Another example is Liu Xiaobo, a young literary critic who tried 
to link contemporary literature to Chinese culture. He criticized 
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Chinese literary tradition and called for the expression of personal 
feeling, individuality, and autonomous artistic production, and for the 
independence of its national uniqueness within the modern metropolitan 
1 2 . 
global culture.‘ Liu was portrayed as an enthusiastic Westernizer for 
his pleading for "wholesale Westernization." 
However, all their works share the common idea that the 
reconstruction of Chinese culture explicitly required an important role 
for intellectuals. Not surprisingly China's student demonstrators, 
particularly those involved in 1989 protests, were influenced by these 
intellectuals, some of whom had actively participated in the Tiananmen 
Square demonstrations in support of the students. 
Although the June Fourth massacre silenced most of these 
intellectuals, forced them into exile or landed some of them in jail, 
the flow of their ideas could not be stopped. The bleakness of the 
current political situation in China led the younger intellectuals to 
contemplate China's future further. Many of those who stay in China are 
no longer blindly obedient. They try to use orderly, effective and 
i 1 ( . . 
legal ways to counter pressures from the party-state.“ Their quiet 
defiance and courage indicates China's intellectuals have been 
transformed. Moreover, as long as modernization remains the party's 
goal, the dissenters would not be completely repressed without 
jeopardizing the modernization program. There is still reason to 
believe that the intellectual's task of creative reflection goes on. 
INTELLECTUALS AND REFORM 
This paper's main theme is the indisputable reality that China's 
reforms need the participation of intellectuals in all positions if 
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they are to succeed. At the same time, the intellectuals stratum must 
be reformed in order to extricate China from its traditional cultural 
predicament. Only then can China be reformed, and only then can 
intellectuals push forward the modernization program. 
China's intellectuals must became a detached stratum, clearly 
autonomous from the party-state. Intellectuals should develop 
independent social functions, status and value orientations. That is to 
say, they should depend only on the search for knowledge and truth to 
build up their status, and on a consciousness that transcends ideology 
to criticize society. They should not change their views when subjected 
to pressure from above. They must bear the responsibility of 
enlightenment. As Liu Xiaobo acknowledges, as the representatives and 
quintessence of national intelligence, intellectuals should consciously 
rethink traditional assumptions and criticize the conservatism of the 
Chinese in order to av/aken the people.^^ Indeed, China's reform should 
not only improve peoples' living standards but also change souls. There 
is definitely a need to change traditional culture in response to the 
1 
exigencies of modernization. China needs intellectuals in technical-
constructive roles but more importantly in the critical, creative 
roles. 
Furthermore, China's intellectuals must avoid the twin 
temptations of total withdrawal from and total integration into 
politics. In seeking this difficult balance between participation and 
detachment, the words of Lewis A. Coser are revealing: 
Criticism and detachment will always mark him, so that he 
will always be in the society without fully being of it. A 
certain degree of estrangement is the very precondition for 
playing the intellectual's role. Yet this detachment may at 
the same time be based on a deeply felt commitment to the 
ideals and central values on which the society rests In 
this sense, intellectuals may indeed be detached while they 
are at the same time deeply concerned. Such an attitude 
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permits them to transcend both affective neutrality and 
blind involvement through detached concern with the fate of 
one's society and one's fellow men•丄 
China's intellectuals must also understand that it is their 
mission to check and criticize the government while they devote 
themselves to the search for truth. This search can at the same time 
enhance their power to perform their role as critics. However, the crux 
of maintaining this role successfully is the need to strengthen their 
independent status. Certainly, whether a social stratum can develop its 
independent status is closely linked with a more liberal political 
environment and an open social atmosphere. It is also the duty of 
Chilians intellectuals to take the initiative and fight for these goals. 
In other words, Chinese intellectuals must work together to fight for 
better conditions for themselves so that they can act as a truly 
autonomous force in China's reform movement. Although party-state 
policies towards intellectuals will obviously be important limiting 
factors, Chinese intellectuals cannot afford to wait for a green light 
from Beijing before they decide to grow up. That green light may never 
come unless intellectuals urge it through their own development as an 
independent social stratum. 
In sum, what should today's Chinese intellectuals do? What can 
they do? As professor Hsu Cho-yun suggests, Chinese intellectuals, as 
a group should do more preparation. They should both promote a 
democratic political system for China and come together to develop as 
a stronger social force. They need to cast off their sense of 
superiority, replacing it with a new modesty and willingness to co-
operate with people to solve the problems of China. Since Chinese 
culture is stranded in a deep valley, it is the mission of Chinese 
intellectuals to help find a way to lead it up into 七 h e sunshine.' 
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EPILOGUE 
After passing through forty years of torture, there are now signs 
that China's intellectuals are beginning to stand up. In particular the 
"generation as old as the Republic" have tried to liberate their mind 
from the shackles of traditional feudalistic thinking. China has 
grievously, repeatedly and callously wounded this generation, but their 
enduring patriotism still serves as a force propelling the country 
forward. No matter where they are, aboard or in their motherland, the 
members of this group are dedicated to advancing China. As the older 
generation dies off, the "generation as old as the Republic" will play 
an even more crucial role in future. Because their common experiences 
have helped solidify their sense of mission, they have the potential to 
become a force that could provide some checks and balances on 
government, to be proposers of policy, and interpreters of the demands 
and desires of less articulate groups. They have special potential as 
bridge between workers and peasants. If they can blend the best of 
t 
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Western ideals about intellectual independence with the best in Chinese 
ideals about sense of mission of scholars, they will serve the country 
well. However, they still confront considerable limitations, both 
political and psychological, on the road to becoming modern 
intellectuals. 
The fortunes of the "generation as old as the Republic" closely 
reflects the history of the PRC itself. Their trends of thought, may 
also serve as beacons indicating the direction of China's future. 
Therefore, it is critical that there is further study of the life and 
work of the members of this group. One useful approach would be to 
compare the "generation as old as the Republic" with the May-Fourth 
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generation of Chinese intellectuals. People may find that there are 
similarities of their thinking, particularly their iconoclasm and 
advocacy of democracy and science. In addition, they both experienced 
the influence of an influx of Western ideas. In fact, some members of 
the "generation as old as the Republic" have claimed they would like to 
return to the thinking of the May-Fourth generation in order to go 
beyond it. Certainly, the rather different fates of these two 
generations gave them different expectations of their roles in the 
modernization process. Li Zehou has argued that the May-Fourth 
generation felt that the mission of national salvation (jiu-wang) had 
to prevail over the mission of enlightenment (qi-meng) . Thus, they 
drifted away from creative endeavour toward politics, which 
1S 
consequently landed Chinese intellectuals in political trouble. China 
currently faces a crisis of comparable seriousness. How the younger 
intellectuals deal with the dual pressures of "national salvation" and 
"enlightenment" will be an interesting subject of study in future. 
China is at a critical juncture now and so are its intellectuals. ] 
1 
However, it is also an opportunity for change and progress. Hopefully, 
my study helps in some small way to mark a way forward. 
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